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Poorly defended third-party information networks can act as an attack vector for 
cyber attackers to successfully breach larger and more robustly defended information 
networks. Therefore, third-party networks connecting to Department of Defense (DOD) 
information networks may pose a significant risk to the DOD. The DOD has attempted to 
alleviate this risk to its networks by requiring covered defense contractors to meet certain 
network security standards and by initiating a cyber threat information sharing program: 
the DOD Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security/Information Assurance (CS/IA) 
Program. However, these DOD actions are not aggressive enough to adequately mitigate 
this risk to DOD networks. To adequately address this problem, an expanded and more 
aggressive incentive-based program is required. Existing federal government, incentive-
based programs were analyzed as potential exemplars from which to build a new 
incentive-based network security program. The Department of Homeland Security’s 
(DHS’s) Safety Act Program was ultimately chosen as the primary exemplar. Using this 
model, an Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program was designed to offer the DOD a system that 
can influence the improvement of third-party network security through a structure of 
synchronized network security controls and incentives. By implementing the proposed 
DOD Enhanced CS/IA Program to improve the network security of third-party networks 
that connect to DOD networks, the DOD can better mitigate the risk of cyber attacks to 
its own networks. 
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On July 12, 2011, Department of Defense (DOD) contractor Booz Allen Hamilton 
acknowledged its network had been breached by the hacktivist group Anti-Security 
(AntiSec).
1
 Using the Booz Allen Hamilton network as an attack vector, the group gained 
access to the DOD’s Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) portal. On September 17, 2014, the 
Senate Armed Services Committee released a report from an inquiry it conducted 
concerning information known to the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) 
about cyber targeting against its contractors. The report stated that from June 01, 2012, to 
May 30, 2013, there were 50 successful known network intrusions against TRANSCOM 
contractors.
2
 These examples show that third-party information networks represent a 
clear risk to the DOD and its operational security. The purpose of this thesis is to improve 
the security of the DOD Information Network (DODIN) by proposing a system that can 
influence improved network security in third-party networks that exchange information 
with the DODIN.  
The current DOD Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security/Information 
Assurance (CS/IA) Program was a starting point for the DOD to reach out to and assist 
the private sector in improving its network security. However, the application of the 
current program is too narrow, and it does not have the capability to influence all third-
party non-DOD networks that contact some part of the DODIN. Also, the DOD DIB CS/
IA Program could do more to further incentivize improved network security of private 
sector third-party networks.  
The DOD DIB CS/IA Program can be significantly enhanced by restructuring it 
into a two-tiered, incentive-based information network security program. This  
 
____________________ 
       1 Acunetix, “Anonymous Hack U.S. Department of Defence—Analysis of the Attack,” Acunetix Blog, 
August 4, 2011, http://www.acunetix.com/blog/news/anonymous-hack-us-department-of-defence-analysis/. 
       2 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry in Cyber Intrusions Affecting U.S. Transportation 




restructured program is called the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program. The enhanced 
program’s two tiers are basic and advanced. Each tier in this program contains different 
levels of security requirements and incentive elements for participants. Figure 1 presents 
a visual depiction of the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program including its security 
requirements and incentive elements: 
 
The width of each tier represents the relative number of expected participants at that tier. 
Figure 1. The Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program Structure 
 
Another course of action for the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program potentially 
exists. In this course of action, the federal government would give control of the 
enhanced program to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Several reasons exist 
why this course of action makes sense and should be considered. First, one of DHS’s core 
missions is to work with the private sector to secure information networks.
3
 Second, due 
to its mission set, DHS has the ability to expand the program’s effects further because 
DHS can apply it to the whole of government. 
____________________ 
       3 “Our Mission,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed April 8, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/our-
mission. 
 xvii 
The author recommends the DOD implement the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program 
as it is presented in this thesis. The author also recommends that the DOD and DHS 
begin discussions to determine which department should operate and control the 
enhanced program. The author recommends placing program control under DHS because 
dealing with the security of private sector information networks is a DHS core mission 
and the program will have greater ability to reduce risk to whole of government and 
private sector under DHS. 
 
 xviii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xix 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank my wife, Sarah Kansteiner, and our boys, James and Cole, 
for having patience with me these past two years and especially these last few months. I 
know it has not always been easy seeing me here but not really “here.” Thank you for all 
of the support and understanding. I could not have accomplished this without you. 
I would also like to thank Dr. Raymond Buettner, Mr. Ramsey Meyer, and Ms. 
Cheryl Huddleston for all of your advice, mentoring, and editing support. You helped to 
unlock my mind and get the ideas flowing. I am not sure that would have happened 
otherwise. Additionally, thanks must go to all the others who answered questions and 
provided information for this thesis. Lastly, thank you to all my fellow cohort members 
and classmates who have helped to get me through all the classes here at NPS and 
provided inspiration when I needed it. 
 
 xx 




On December 19, 2013, the Target Corporation announced they had been the 
victims of an information network breach in which the credit and debit card account 
information of 40 million customers had been compromised.1 Further investigation of the 
breach showed the attackers had been able to breach the Target network through a small 
business that was a third-party service provider the attackers had compromised months 
earlier.2 The attackers were ultimately able to breach the Target network through a 
remote access billing application using the service provider’s network and stolen access 
credentials.3 In this case, the attackers must have assessed that the small third-party 
network represented a more weakly defended and more economical attack vector than 
any vector that directly attacked the Target Corporate network. This example 
demonstrates the security risk that third-party information networks pose to other 
networks they exchange information with. Unfortunately, many other examples of 
network attacks using third-party networks as attack vectors exist.  
Unclassified examples of attackers using third-party networks to attack federal 
government networks exist but are less well known. On July 12, 2011, Department of 
Defense (DOD) contractor Booz Allen Hamilton acknowledged its network had been 
breached by the hacktivist group Anti-Security (AntiSec).4 Using the Booz Allen 
Hamilton network as an attack vector, the group then used a structured query language 
(SQL) injection attack to gain access to the DOD’s Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) portal. 
With that access, the group was able to download approximately 90,000 JKO user 
accounts containing email addresses, hashed passwords, and some personal user 
information.5 Though the DOD and Booz Allen Hamilton tried to downplay the 
                                                 
1 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 
Target Data Breach, 113th Cong., 1, (2014). 
2 Ibid., 4. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Acunetix, “Anonymous Hack U.S. Department of Defence—Analysis of the Attack,” Acunetix Blog, 
August 4, 2011, http://www.acunetix.com/blog/news/anonymous-hack-us-department-of-defence-analysis/. 
5 Ibid. 
 2 
significance of the breach, analysts suggest that the attack method and the information 
stolen indicate that AntiSec was able to escalate its privileges within the JKO portal and 
penetrate deeper into the network than indicated by the victims.6  
On September 17, 2014, the Senate Armed Services Committee released a report 
from an inquiry it conducted concerning information known to the U.S. Transportation 
Command (TRANSCOM) about cyber targeting against its contractors. The report stated 
that from June 01, 2012, to May 30, 2013, there were 50 successful known network 
intrusions against TRANSCOM contractors, with 20 of them being attributed to China.7 
The report did not specify if any TRANSCOM networks were subsequently attacked via 
these contractor networks, but the possibility exists that subsequent network attacks 
against TRANSCOM did occur. The report also states that TRANSCOM was only aware 
of two of the intrusions linked to China.8 So it is also possible TRANSCOM never 
realized that its networks had been attacked through these contractor networks. 
These examples show that third-party information networks represent a clear risk 
to the DOD and its operational security. In many cases, third-party networks do not 
maintain the same level of network security as DOD networks. Thus, attackers will likely 
choose to use third-party networks as a more advantageous attack vector from which to 
attack DOD networks. Currently, the DOD lacks an effective means to mitigate this risk, 
which is the problem this thesis addresses. 
Examining the broader scope of cyber attacks against information networks, it is 
apparent they are a growing problem. They represent a common threat to the interests and 
capabilities of both the private sector and the DOD. Civilian network breaches at Target,9 
Home Depot,10 and many other corporations have grabbed headlines, affected hundreds 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Inquiry in Cyber Intrusions Affecting U.S. Transportation 
Command Contractors, 113th Cong., i, (September 17, 2014).  
8 Ibid. 
9 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, A “Kill Chain” Analysis of the 2013 
Target Data Breach, i. 
10 Sean M. Kerner, “Home Depot Breach Expands, Privilege Escalation Flaw to Blame,” EWeek, 
November 8, 2014, http://www.eweek.com/security/home-depot-breach-expands-privilege-escalation-flaw-
to-blame.html. 
 3 
of millions of people, and financially impacted the victim companies. The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff unclassified email network and the Pentagon food court network have both recently 
been attacked and breached.11 Overall, cyber attacks show no sign of abating in the 
foreseeable future. The 2014 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR) 
recorded 63,437 cyber security incidents with 1,367 confirmed network breaches 
worldwide in 2013.12 When one considers that estimates show less than 1 percent of all 
cyber attacks are actually reported,13 and the contributing body to the Verizon DBIR was 
only 50 organizations,14 the enormity of the threat is obvious. Data shows DOD networks 
alone face thousands of attacks per year.15 Overall, evidence indicates the rate that 
organizations face cyber attacks is only increasing.16 Table 1 shows successful cyber 
attacks against organizations participating in a Ponemon Institute research study (2015) 






                                                 
11 Pierluigi Paganini, “Another Computer System at the Pentagon Has Been Hacked,” Security Affairs 
Blog, September 11, 2015, http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/40039/cyber-crime/pentagon-hacked-
again.html. 
12 Verizon Enterprise, “2014 Data Breach Investigations Report,” 2, (2014), 
http://www.verizonenterprise.com/DBIR/
2014/?utm_source=earlyaccess&utm_medium=redirect&utm_campaign=DBIR. 
13 Nicholas Burns and Jonathon Price, eds., Securing Cyberspace: A New Domain for National 
Security (Queenstown, MD: Aspen Institute, February 2012), 131. 
14 Verizon Enterprise, “2014 Data Breach Investigations Report,” 2. 
15 William J. Lynn III, “Defending a New Domain,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2010, 97. 




Table 1.   Number of Successful Attacks against Organizations17 
Year Number of 
Organizations 







2012 199 262 1.3 
2013 234 343 1.4 
2014 257 429 1.7 
2015 252 477 1.9 
 
The costs associated with cyber attacks can be truly staggering. A single breach at 
a major corporation can easily cost that company hundreds of millions of dollars or more. 
The Target corporation network breach current cost estimate is approximately $160 
million.18 During 2008 and 2009, the DOD reportedly spent over $100 million recovering 
from cyber attacks in just a six-month period.19 Cost estimates such as those noted earlier 
may not even reflect the total cost of cyber attacks. Some damage from cyber attacks are 
difficult to calculate. For example, assigning specific value to intellectual property that is 
lost during attacks is difficult. Also, how does one even put a price on the value of 
national secrets, operational plans, or military capabilities when government and military 
networks are breached? The Lockheed Martin data breach that compromised secret 
information on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter exemplifies a single attack that resulted in a 
loss of intellectual property and exposed military capability.20  
A third-party network is a network belonging to an entity that is not directly 
related to or a sub-component of the central entity or organization in question and is not 
                                                 
17 Adapted from Ibid. 
18 Lori Widmer, “10 Costliest Data Breaches,” National Underwriter/Life & Health Financial Services 
119, no. 7 (July 2015): 46.  
19 Elinor Mills, “Pentagon Spends over $100 Million on Cyberattack Cleanup,” CNET News, April 7, 
2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10214416-83.html. 
20 Siobhan Gorman, August Cole, and Yochi Dreazen, “Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project,” 
Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2009, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB124027491029837401. 
 5 
involved in the processing, transmission, or storage of data within the central network.21 
Third-party networks can represent a wide range of organizations or entities, but common 
examples are partner organizations, material supply vendors, service providers, and sub-
contractors.22 Third-party organization networks represent a potential attack vector into 
the networks of larger organizations they connect to. In many cases, attackers just need to 
find a soft breach point into a defended network in order to pivot within that network to 
reach critical or sensitive areas and accomplish their goals. The third-party networks 
often represent that soft breach point into larger networks. Numerous examples of 
network breaches through third parties exist and those are discussed further in Chapter II.  
Several factors contribute to poor security in third-party networks, but primarily 
the focus is on cost.23 Organizations make network security decisions based on cost 
benefit analyses of the costs to improve network security versus the costs of cyber attacks 
and network breaches.24 As will be discussed later, strengthening network security can be 
an expensive investment. Many private sector companies view this investment as purely a 
cost and not an investment that can add value to the company and ultimately contribute to 
cost savings.25 In short, companies only consider the direct costs of network security 
investments in their analyses but not any of the intangible benefits these investments may 
provide. Organizations also often fail to completely consider costs of cyber attacks in 
their analyses. The difficulties in accurately calculating the true costs of cyber attacks 
will be discussed in more detail later, but it is something that is very hard to do well. 
Inaccurate cost calculations will obviously lead to poor cost analyses and affect network 
security decision making. Additionally, the direct costs to victim organizations associated 
                                                 
21 PCI Security Standards Council, “Information Supplement: Third-Party Security Assurance,” 2 
(August 2014), https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/
PCI_DSS_V3.0_Third_Party_Security_Assurance.pdf. 
22 Karen Kroll, “Are Your Business Partners Letting in the Hackers?” Compliance Week, November 
25, 2014, 64. 
23 John Keller, “Defense Industry Concerned about Cyber Security; Not Sure Where to turn for Help,” 
Military & Aerospace Electronics 21, no. 6 (June 2015): 8. 
24 Larry Clinton, “The Value Proposition for Cyber Security: Does It Exist and How Can We Create 
it,” Internet Security Alliance, 4 (2006), http://www.isalliance.org/presentation/
1_ISA_Overview_Presentations/2006_12_00_Larry_Clinton_Commerce_Department_Presentation.pdf. 
25 Tim Scully, “The Cyber Security Threat Stops in the Boardroom,” Journal of Business Continuity & 
Emergency Planning 7, no. 2 (Winter 2013/2014): 140. 
 6 
with cyber attacks are often diluted, so the victims may not feel the full financial brunt of 
attacks.26 This occurs because costs, such as replacing credit cards, may not be directly 
born by the attacks’ victims.27 Also, things like cyber insurance policies and tax write-
offs can serve to lessen the financial impact to cyber attack victims.28 For these reasons, 
many organizations fail to see good business value in network security investments and 
consequently, make network security decisions that leave their networks vulnerable. 
One method for network owners to improve the security of their own networks is 
to promote better security in the third-party networks they connect to. So this thesis 
specifically focuses on the threat posed by third-party networks, and how the DOD may 
be able to improve its own network security by assisting and providing incentives for 
select third parties to improve their network security. This thesis is going to accomplish 
this objective by analyzing current federal government programs that promote security 
within the private sector and then make recommendations for how these programs can be 
used to influence third-party network security.  
To further illustrate the threat third-party networks represent to the DOD, the next 
section will present a short scenario of how an attacker might go about conducting an 
attack on a DOD network through a third party. This scenario itself is hypothetical, but 
utilizes an actual TRANSCOM network application as its core element in order to create 
a scenario that is realistic. The previous TRANSCOM example also demonstrates the 
applicability of the following scenario. 
A. THIRD-PARTY NETWORK ATTACK SCENARIO 
This scenario incorporates the U.S. Transportation Command’s (TRANSCOM) 
Single Mobility System (SMS) 10.3.0 website,29 and the transportation and shipping 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 140–141. 
27 Benjamin Dean, “Sorry Consumers, Companies Have Little Incentive to Invest in Better 
Cybersecurity,” Quartz, March 05, 2015, http://qz.com/356274/cybersecurity-breaches-hurt-consumers-
companies-not-so-much/. 
28 Ibid. 
29 “SMS,” Single Mobility System 10.3.0, accessed April 16, 2016, https://sms.transcom.mil/sms-perl/
smswebstart.pl. SMS is a web-based unclassified computer system that provides visibility of air, sea, and 
land transportation assets.  
 7 
companies that service TRANSCOM requirements. The SMS site is part of the larger 
DOD information network (DODIN) and has network links to other parts of the DODIN. 
The transportation and shipping companies pass information on transportation assets and 
movement schedules through their individual networks using remote access to SMS. 
Obviously, information on the movement schedules of U.S. military forces and assets 
would be an inviting target for many potential attackers, but the link between these 
companies and the SMS site is also an attack vector into the DODIN. So in this scenario, 
the transportation companies’ networks are the third-party networks and cyber attacks 
against them represent a more significant risk to the DOD than just the loss of the 
transportation information. Attacks against these third-party networks represent an 
increased risk of a breach into the DODIN. 
The attackers know they must carefully prepare to succeed in this attack. They 
start by conducting research, probably Internet-based, on transportation companies that 
TRANSCOM is currently using.30 The attackers then conduct reconnaissance, or 
footprinting,31 on the companies’ networks. In this step, the attackers begin to map the 
companies’ networks, determine what type of IT systems the companies are using, look 
for email addresses and other company contact information, and look for background 
information on the companies and their employees. During this initial footprinting, the 
attackers’ goal is to obtain as much background information as possible on these 
companies. The attackers’ next steps are active scans of the companies’ networks to scan 
for open ports, services, and network vulnerabilities using pre-built cyber attack tool 
kits.32 They also use these tool kits to execute exploits against any vulnerability they find 
in an initial attempt to gain access to any of these networks they can. Using information 
gathered during footprinting, the attackers also likely send malware-laced emails 
specifically crafted to target select employees in spear fishing attacks against these 
companies. The successful exploits against network vulnerabilities and malware 
delivered through the successful spear fishing attacks allow the attackers to gain access to 
                                                 
30 See Appendix A for results of the author’s Google search of TRANSCOM contracts. 
31 Stuart McClure, Joel Scambray, and George Kurtz, Hacking Exposed, 7th ed. (New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill, 2012), 8. 
32 Ibid., 47. 
 8 
numerous networks of TRANSCOM’s contractors. Once insides these companies’ 
networks, the attackers expand their presence within the networks. The attackers 
eventually select the transportation company network that provides them the optimal 
attack vector into the TRANSCOM network.  
TRANCOM uses an electronic data interchange (EDI) to transfer information 
between the transportation company and TRANSCOM’s SMS site. Once the attackers 
have gained access to the transportation company’s network, they are able to access the 
server communicating with the EDI and work through that server using credentials stolen 
from the transportation company to infiltrate TRANSCOM’s SMS site. The attackers 
now not only have access to valuable DOD transportation information, but more 
importantly to them, are also able to access the outer edge of the DODIN. The attackers 
spend time mapping and enumerating the section of the DODIN they have accessed and 
are eventually able to identify vulnerabilities in the DODIN’s internal security structure 
that should isolate the SMS site from other parts of the DODIN. They may also discover 
vulnerabilities that allow them escalate the user privileges with which they accessed the 
DODIN. The attackers then exploit these vulnerabilities and pivot to other parts of the 
DODIN where they can gather additional information, negatively impact or corrupt data, 
create backdoors or other access points into the DODIN, or carry out any other objectives 
they have. 
While this exact scenario with the TRANSCOM SMS site and transportation 
company networks may never come to pass, this type of cyber attack is very plausible. 
The DOD deals with hundreds of vendors and service providers, with many of these 
being small companies and businesses that may not have invested in robust network 
security themselves. As information networks become increasingly interconnected and 
automated, information exchange is going to occur between the DOD and these third 
parties via an electronic information exchange. These third parties, particularly those with 
less secure networks, may provide access to attackers targeting the DODIN and thus, are 
a risk to DOD network security. While this risk can never be completely eliminated, it 
can be mitigated by improving the security of third-party networks that interact with the 
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DODIN. This thesis will identify actions the DOD can take to improve third-party 
network security and provide recommendations on how to implement them. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to improve the security of the DODIN by proposing a 
system that can influence improved network security in third-party networks that 
exchange information with the DODIN. The research for this thesis will primarily focus 
on the networks of vendors and contractors who provide products or services to the DOD, 
however, the recommendations may be applied to any third-party networks that interact 
with the DODIN. These third-party networks represent a potential security risk to the 
DODIN. If not secured properly, these third-party networks are potential attack vectors 
against the DODIN. The ultimate goal of this research is to provide recommendations on 
actions the DOD can take to influence third-party network owners to improve the security 
posture of their networks, thus reducing the risk they pose to the DODIN. 
C. ANALYSIS METHODS 
This thesis uses the systems engineering process and a defense acquisition 
methodology to analyze and identify specific DODIN security shortfalls and identify 
system requirements to meet those security shortfalls. Feasible solutions that are 
affordable are analyzed to recommend a system to the DOD that can fill the operational 
need created by these shortfalls. Since a detailed analysis of the systems engineering 
process is given in Chapter II, that material will not be covered in this section. This 
section merely describes the analysis method used to address this particular problem. 
The systems engineering process begins with the definition of problem or a 
need.33 Analyzing the previous examples of the risks posed by third-party networks and 
other similar examples in Chapter II, the problem is the DOD’s lack of ability to 
influence the network security of third-party networks that connect to the DODIN. In the 
next step, an initial set of top level system requirements are generated from the identified 
                                                 
33 Benjamin S. Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 4th ed. (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2008), 51–52. 
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problem or shortfall.34 The top-level system requirements to address the problem 
identified in this thesis are: set specific network security standards for the third-party 
networks; provide influence mechanisms that can convince third-party networks to meet 
these network security standards; provide verification mechanisms to ensure third-party 
networks meet these network security standards; provide reporting mechanisms from 
third-party networks to the DOD; and function within the larger DODIN network security 
system-of-systems (SOS).  
Once the systems engineering process has identified the need and the system 
requirements, the DOD uses an acquisition methodology to make a material development 
decision (MDD), which is whether the DOD will pursue as material or non-material 
solution.35 A non-material solution generally manifests in the form of a doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy 
(DOTMLPF-P) analysis and Joint DOTMLPF-P change request (DCR) validation.36 A 
material solution manifests in the form an actual physical system that is acquired through 
the Defense Acquisition System (DAS).37 The DOD can obtain a material solution via 
several methods: procurement or modification of a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or 
government-off-the-self (GOTS) system; modification of an existing DOD system; or 
development of a completely new system.38 The literature reviewed in Chapter II and the 
analysis in Chapter III shows that the DOD and federal government as a whole have 
already attempted to address the need for more influence in third-party network security 
with DOTMLPF-P solutions. Those DOTMLPF-P solutions do not meet the system 
requirements set previously. No viable material solutions were identified during research, 
thus this thesis presents a non-material solution to meet these system requirements. 
                                                 
34 Ibid., 19. 
35 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Capabilities Integration and Development 
System (JCIDS), CJCS Instruction 3170.01I, Washington, DC: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(CJCS), January 23, 2015, A14-A15. 
36 Ibid., A14. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), The Defense Acquisition System, DOD Directive 5000.01, 
Washington, DC: Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), 2007, 8. 
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Consequently, this thesis analyzes recommendations for a DOTMLPF-P solution through 
modifications in organization, personnel, and policy of an existing DOD system. 
The functional analysis in Chapter IV of the proposed system is the final step of 
the systems engineering process explored in this thesis. This step analyzes the previously 
set top level system requirements and links them to the proposed system’s functions in 
order to satisfy the DOD’s operational need. Thus, the functional analysis of the system 
set the overall system design and led to recommendations on that design to the DOD. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Third-party information technology (IT) networks can potentially represent a 
significant security risk to any large data network. In fact, history has shown large, well-
protected networks are often attacked through third parties. Data breaches at Target,39 
Home Depot,40 and other corporations41 are prime examples of successful network 
attacks through third-party networks. This review has six total sections with the first five 
sections relating to different areas of cyber security that are important for addressing this 
problem: 1) network vulnerability assessments, 2) cyber security reports, 3) third-party 
network breaches, 4) U.S. government cyber security actions, and 5) monetary costs of 
cyber-attacks. The sixth section reviews the systems engineering process. This review 
provides evidence that third-party networks represent a significant and costly risk to 
Department of Defense (DOD) data networks, and there are potentially actions the DOD 
can take to influence the security of those third-party networks. The information from this 
review supports the arguments that aim to propose strategies the DOD can utilize to 
influence third-party network owners to improve the security of their networks. 
B. NETWORK VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS 
This section of the literature review specifically focuses on one aspect of 
computer network security; network vulnerability assessments. Network vulnerability 
assessment as a topic is well-studied, and there has been a significant amount written on 
it. The goal of this review is to identify specific non-proprietary vulnerability assessment 
tools the DOD could share with third-party network owners for use on their own 
networks. In general, a vulnerability assessment is simply an analysis of a system to 
                                                 
39 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, “A Kill Chain Analysis of the 2013 
Target Data Breach,” i. 
40 Kerner, “Home Depot Breach Expands, Privilege Escalation Flaw to Blame.” 
41 Kroll, “Are Your Business Partners Letting in the Hackers?” 64.  
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identify, quantify, and prioritize system vulnerabilities.42 For the purposes of this review, 
that system is an information network. The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) recognizes the importance of continually testing networks for 
vulnerabilities so they can be corrected before they can be exploited.43 Pandey et al., 
recognize the four phases of network assessment as reconnaissance, network scanning, 
vulnerability assessment, and exploitation.44 Vulnerability assessment tools are utilized to 
uncover specific network weaknesses so that corrective action may be taken before an 
attacker is able to exploit the weaknesses. Vulnerability assessment tools come in two 
main flavors, network scanners and vulnerability scanners.45  
Network scanners, also called network discovery or host discovery tools,46 are 
designed to either actively or passively scan networks and hosts to discover open and 
active ports and services according to Pandey et al.47 Attackers can potentially use open 
ports as avenues to penetrate networks. Network scanners can identify ports that network 
administrators may not know are open. If these ports are not required to be open for 
normal network operations, network administrators can close them, thereby eliminating 
potential attack vectors. Common network scanners include NMAP, Superscan, Cain,48 
Portqry, Nbtscan,49 and others. 
Vulnerability scanners are designed to assess a network for known vulnerabilities 
in the network structure, and in network hosts, which have not yet had patches applied.50 
                                                 
42 Sudhir K. Pandey et al., “Implementation of A New Framework for Automated Network Security 
Checking and Alert System,” 2014 Eleventh International Conference on Wireless and Optical 
Communications Networks (WOCN), (2014): 4, doi: 10.1109/WOCN.2014.6923089. 
43 Aniwat Hemanidhi et al., “Network Risk Evaluation from Security Metric of Vulnerability 
Detection Tools,” 2014 IEEE Region 10 Conference, (2014): 2, doi: 10.1109/TENCON.2014.7022358.  
44 Pandey et al., “Implementation of A New Framework for Automated Network Security Checking 
and Alert System,” 1. 
45 Ibid., 1–2. 
46 Stuart McClure, Joel Scabray, and George Kurtz, Hacking Exposed, 53, 55. 
47 Pandey et al., “Implementation of A New Framework for Automated Network Security Checking 
and Alert System,” 3. 
48 Stuart McClure, Joel Scabray, and George Kurtz, Hacking Exposed, 49, 51, 55. 
49 Pandey et al., “Implementation of A New Framework for Automated Network Security Checking 
and Alert System,” 5. 
50 Ibid., 2. 
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Vulnerability scanners work based on known system, either software or hardware based, 
vulnerabilities that are stored in their databases. Pandey et al. says a given system type 
can have many hundreds or more known vulnerabilities.51 Scanning large networks with 
potentially thousands of systems that can each have potentially hundreds or thousands of 
vulnerabilities is obviously a large task. Hemanidhi et al. claim that as speed in 
discovering and patching vulnerabilities in networks is critical, automated high speed 
scanning tools are desired.52 Yoon and Sim (2007) note that vulnerability scanning tools 
can also be active or passive, and both varieties are sometimes used as they each have 
negatives and positives.53 Often, these assessment tools have the means to rank 
vulnerabilities based on their severity level to allow network administrators to prioritize 
the corrective actions they need to take. Common vulnerability scanners include Nessus, 
Retina,54 OpenVas, NMAP,55 and others. 
Research from Yoon and Sim (2007), Hemanidhi et al. (2014), and Pandey et al., 
(2014) has definitively shown that multiple tools working in concert produce a much 
more thorough assessment.56 Individual network scanners and vulnerability scanners 
have their own strengths and weaknesses; using only one will likely leave gaps in the 
overall vulnerability assessment. These gaps might be found and exploited by an attacker 
using different tools.  
Network vulnerability assessments are key component of both attack and defense 
strategies in information networks. Actual network vulnerability scanners are a tool DOD 
can offer to third-party network owners to aid them in incorporating network 
vulnerability assessments into their network defense strategies. Thus, providing access to 
                                                 
51 Ibid., 2. 
52 Hemanidhi et al., “Network Risk Evaluation from Security Metric of Vulnerability Detection 
Tools,” 1. 
53 Jun Yoon and Wontae Sim, “Implementation of the Automated Network Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework,” 4th International Conference on Information Technology, 2007, (2007): 154, doi: 10.1109/
IIT.2007.4430423. 
54 Hemanidhi et al., “Network Risk Evaluation from Security Metric of Vulnerability Detection 
Tools,” 1. 
55 Stuart McClure, Joel Scabray, and George Kurtz, Hacking Exposed, 87–88. 
56 Ibid., 153. See also Hemanidhi et al. (2014) and Pandey et al. (2014). 
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these assessment tools to third-party network owners becomes part of the thesis’s 
incentivized influence strategy. 
C. CYBER SECURITY REPORTS 
Reviewing cyber security reports is important to this review as these reports can 
be used to help grasp the enormity of the risks that cyber-attacks represent to both the 
DOD and the private sector and providing justification for both to cooperate in mutual 
defense initiatives. This review specifically searched for information on cyber-attacks 
using third-party networks as attack vectors or cyber-attacks conducted by third-party 
network owners themselves. Both of these are related in that the attackers use the third-
party network as conduit for the attack. 
In 2012, the Defense Science Board (DSB) produced a report reviewing and 
providing recommendations on the resiliency of DOD systems to cyber-attack. In the 
report, the DSB describes the cyber threat by dividing it into three classes of varying 
sophistication. The DSB uses the cyber attackers’ level of resourcing and sophistication 
in using either known tools and vulnerabilities or creating their own to make class 
determinations.57 These threat classes are then used to create a basic taxonomy of the 
attackers by dividing them into six distinct tiers,58 which serves as an attempt to identify 
and define the overall cyber threat. Table 2 defines each threat tier and Figure 1 depicts 
the DSB’s overall attacker taxonomy: 
                                                 
57 Defense Science Board Task Force on Resilient Military Systems, Resilient Military Systems and 
the Advanced Cyber Threat, 21, (2013), http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/
ResilientMilitarySystems.CyberThreat.pdf. 
58 Ibid., 22. 
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Table 2.   Description of Cyber Threat Tiers59 
I 
Practitioners who rely on others to develop the malicious code, delivery 
mechanisms, and execution strategy (use known exploits). 
II 
Practitioners with a greater depth of experience, with the ability to develop 
their own tools (from publically known vulnerabilities). 
III 
Practitioners who focus on the discovery and use of unknown malicious 
code, are adept at installing user and kernel mode root kits10, frequently use 
data mining tools, target corporate executives and key users (government and 
industry) for the purpose of stealing personal and corporate data with the 
expressed purpose of selling the information to other criminal elements. 
IV 
Criminal or state actors who are organized, highly technical, proficient, well- 
funded professionals working in teams to discover new vulnerabilities and 
develop exploits. 
V 
State actors who create vulnerabilities through an active program to 
“influence” commercial products and services during design, development or 
manufacturing, or with the ability to impact products while in the supply 
chain to enable exploitation of networks and systems of interest. 
VI 
States with the ability to successfully execute full spectrum (cyber 
capabilities in combination with all of their military and intelligence 
capabilities) operations to achieve a specific outcome in political, military, 
economic, etc., domains and apply at scale. 
 
                                                 
59 Source: Ibid., 22–23. 
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Dollar figures represent the nominal investment amount required to operate at a given tier. 
Figure 1.  Cyber Threat Taxonomy60 
The report then moves on to describe the possible consequences to both U.S. 
military forces and the United States at large in the face of sophisticated sustained 
attacks. These include the degradation of operational performance and erosion of trust in 
information systems for the U.S. military, and the breakdown of basic civil services 
inside the nation.61 The DSB attempts to set the expectation that networks and systems 
can never be made completely secure and that a threshold of “good enough”62 based on 
threat parameters and mission requirements should be set for cyber security. The report 
then moves into its recommendation section in which there are many that cover a wide 
range of capabilities. The DSB also provides monetary and timeframe estimates to 
implement the DSB’s recommendations. Table 3 depicts the DSB’s estimates to 
implement its recommendations: 
                                                 
60 Source: Ibid., 21. 
61 Ibid., 28. 
62 Ibid., 30. 
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Table 3.   Defense Science Board’s Estimated Cyber Security Investment 
Requirements63 
  Cost Timeframe 
1 Protect the Nuclear Strike as a Deterrent (for 
existing nuclear armed states and existential cyber 
attack). 
>$500M/yr 36-60 mo. 
2 Determine the Mix of Cyber, Protected-
Conventional, and Nuclear Capabilities Necessary 
for Assured Operation in the Face of a Full-
Spectrum Adversary. 
>$500M/yr 36-60 mo. 
3 Refocus Intelligence Collection and Analysis to 
Understand Adversarial Cyber Capabilities, Plans 
and Intentions, and to Enable Counterstrategies. 
<$50M/yr 12-24 mo. 
4 Build and Maintain World-Class Cyber Offensive 
Capabilities (with appropriate authorities). 
$50M-$100M/yr 12-24 mo. 
5 Enhance Defenses to Protect Against Low and 
Mid-Tier Threats. 
<$50M/yr 6-18 mo. 
6 Change DOD’s Culture Regarding Cyber and 
Cyber Security. 
<$50M/yr 12-48 mo. 
7 Build a Cyber Resilient Force. $50M-$100M/yr 12-24 mo. 
 
The Verizon Enterprise produces an annual data breach investigation report. The 
2014 report, which covered network data breaches and security incidents recorded in 
2013, was used for this research.64 The report focused on corporate world, but it is still 
useful for this study as threats and trends identified here are relatable to the DOD as well. 
The report broke the sample data down into a wide array of statistics covering categories 
such as attack methods, target types, time to complete attacks, time to discover attacks 
and breaches, breach discovery methods, motive for attacks, and others. The report also 
compares like statistical categories from the 2013 data against previous years’ data. From 
these statistics, the report was able to identify several overarching patterns. In fact, the 
team was able to group 94 percent of all network breaches in 2013 into one of nine 
categories.65 After analyzing previous years’ data, the team found a similar percentage of 
                                                 
63 Adapted from Ibid., 82. 
64 Verizon Enterprise, “2014 Data Breach Investigations Report,” 13. 
65 Ibid., 13. 
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attacks from these years could also be grouped to the same nine categories. Table 4 
displays these categories and their relative occurrence percentages: 
Table 4.   Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report’s Network Breach 
Category Patterns66 




Web App Attacks 35% 21% 
Insider Misuse 8% 8% 
Physical Theft/Loss <1% 1% 
Miscellaneous Errors 2% 1% 
Crimeware 4% 4% 




Cyber-espionage 22% 15% 
Everything else 6% 5% 
For 2013, n = 1,367 breaches. 
For 2011–2013, n = 2,861 breaches. 
 
More importantly for this study, the report presented findings related to third 
parties or third-party networks. The report identified that in a significant percentage of 
corporate cases an attack would originate in an individual store, and the attacker would 
then use that access to penetrate the corporate networks.67 As the store network and 
corporate network are often separate, this can be viewed as an attack through a third-
party network. As indicated in the report, remote access software to support third-party 
access to corporate networks also seems to be a commonly shared threat vector in many 
attacks.68 Consequently, Verizon Enterprise recommends corporations limit third-party 
access to their networks, ensure all vendors and service providers are clear when they 
                                                 
66 Adapted from Ibid., 14. 
67 Ibid., 17. 
68 Ibid., 19. 
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should access the corporate network to complete their third-party duties, and corporations 
should institute multi-factor authentication procedures for their networks.69  
The Defense Security Service (DSS) published its 2015 annual report on the 
targeting of cleared U.S. defense contractors by those attempting to gain information on 
U.S. military technology. The report’s dataset consisted of self-reporting by the cleared 
contractors for 2014 incidents. DSS notes that reporting from the defense industry has 
been steadily increasing, 8 percent alone from 2013 to 2014 datasets.70 Similar to other 
reports, the DSS broke their data set into different statistical categories. The data was also 
divided into subsets based on six geographical regions and comparisons were made 
among the different regions. The report listed electronics as the most targeted technology 
category.71 As reporting from cleared contractors has increased, DSS is getting a clearer 
picture of the threats against the U.S. defense industrial base. DSS believes foreign 
entities are still motivated to gain information on U.S. critical technologies, and DSS 
assesses attacks against cleared contractors to gain that information will continue for the 
foreseeable future.72 DSS predicts cyber-attacks will continue to be one of the preferred 
means to target cleared contractors, and the attackers will almost certainly use 
employees,73 sub-contractors, service providers, and vendors (third parties) as attack 
vectors. 
Reports from several additional sources such as McAfee Labs that produces a 
quarterly threat report and the U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) 
that completed a study on Cyber infrastructure protection were reviewed for this research. 
These reports provided different statistics, trends, and conclusions on cyber-attacks and 
threats. One McAfee report listed numerous recommended policies and procedures for 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 19. 
70 Defense Security Service, 2015 Targeting U.S. Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Cleared Industry 
Reporting, 10, (2015), http://www.dss.mil/ci/ci_reports.html. 
71 Ibid., 19. 
72 Ibid., 44. 
73 Ibid., 45. 
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data protection.74 The Army War College report contained a useful data point on attacks 
by third parties on networks. The report stated three industry-leading data aggregation 
companies were each attacked and their networks breached in the 2003 to 2005 
timeframe.75 In each case, other entities in business with these companies were able to 
access their networks and steal data, with one of the companies being breached twice and 
losing over a billion records total.76  
Cyber security reports are important because they give a perspective of the overall 
cyber threat environment that exists today. Also, almost all these cyber security reports 
had some reference relating to third-party networks, which served to highlight the risks 
they pose to other organizational networks. Thus, these cyber security reports strengthen 
the claim that third-party networks pose a security risk to DOD networks. 
D. THIRD-PARTY NETWORK ATTACKS 
Several pieces of literature specifically addressed network attacks executed 
through third-party networks. This should not be surprising, considering several high 
profile corporate network breaches have used third-party networks as attack vectors. 
Most notably was the Target corporation breach, but others such as Home Depot, several 
large hotel chains, Barclay’s,77 AT&T, Goodwill, and others78 have been successfully 
attacked through third parties as well. 
According to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
report, the Target network was first breached by the attackers on November 12, 2013, and 
the attackers where not removed from the Target network until December 15, 2013.79 
                                                 
74 McAfee Labs. McAfee Labs Threat Report, 25, (August, 2015), http://www.mcafee.com/us/mcafee-
labs.aspx. 
75 Tarek Saadawi and Louis Jordan, eds., “Cyber Infrastructure Protection,” 52, (2011), 
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1067.pdf. 
76 Ibid., 52–53 & 57. 
77 Penny Crosman, “Target Breach Was Months in the Making,” American Banker, February 12, 
2014, 1, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1497400210?accountid=12702. 
78 Kroll, “Are Your Business Partners Letting in the Hackers?” 64. 
79 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, “A Kill Chain Analysis of the 2013 
Target Data Breach,” 12. 
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The attackers penetrated Target’s network by first stealing access credentials from an 
HVAC service provider who had remote access to Target’s electronic billing system.80 
The attackers sent malware-infected email to the HVAC service provider to steal the 
access credentials and were then able to exploit a default billing account with those 
credentials.81 The Senate Committee report indicated a leading theory as to how the 
attackers discovered the HVAC service provider was simple Internet searches for 
Target’s vendors and service providers.82 Similarly, reporting by Kerner shows the Home 
Depot network was also breached when a third-party vendor who had remote access to 
the company’s network had their access credentials compromised.83 An article by 
Crosman has the same scenario for the hotel chain breaches where a common sub-
contractor’s network was breached, allowing the attackers to steal access credentials to 
each of the hotel chains’ networks.84 
Estimates vary, but a conservative one according to Kroll is that one third of all 
network attacks are somehow linked to current or former vendors, sub-contractors, 
service providers, or other third parties, and only 44 percent of network administrators 
have a formalized process for evaluating the risk posed by third-party networks that 
contact their own networks.85 Even very tangential relationships can pose a risk. A large 
oil firm was attacked using a popular Chinese restaurant network as an attack vector 
because the oil firm’s employees routinely accessed the restaurant’s website for its online 
menu.86  
Most large organizations allow some type of third-party access to their networks 
as these third parties provide some type of required service for the organization. 
Goldstein says this access to networks can provide an easier attack vector for the 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 4. 
81 Ibid., 8, 10. 
82 Ibid., 7. 
83 Kerner, “Home Depot Breach Expands, Privilege Escalation Flaw to Blame.” 
84 Crosman, “Target Breach was Months in the Making,” 64. 
85 Kroll, “Are Your Business Partners Letting in the Hackers,” 64. 
86 Ibid., 64. 
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attacking entity.87 An attack vector through a third-party network is attractive because 
large corporations and government networks are typically better protected and represent a 
relatively hard target. However, networks belonging to smaller entities providing services 
to these corporations or the government are often much less protected, and represent a 
potentially less defended access point to the larger network.88 Goldstein highlights that a 
cautious network administrator will only view their network security as being as good as 
the security of the third-party networks their networks interact with.89  
To mitigate the threats from third-party networks, network administrators can take 
several actions. First, as noted in the previous section on cyber security reports, cyber 
security experts recommend network administrators should have multi-factor 
authentication procedures in place for all third parties with remote access to their 
networks.90 Goldstein also recommends administrators for large networks require third 
parties conduct self-assessments of their networks, but he notes this option has significant 
drawbacks, not the least of which is ensuring the third party actually accomplishes the 
assessments or has the technical capability to effectively conduct a self-assessment.91 
Goldstein notes a more thorough option would be for the larger entity to have their own 
network administrators carry out the assessment function on the third party or hire a 
cyber security firm to conduct the assessment.92 Since this option could potentially be 
very time consuming and resource intensive depending on the number of third parties that 
connect to a larger network, there is another more refined option. Third parties should be 
assessed by their level of remote access to a larger network, as well as, the type of data 
they hold or have access to. The third parties are then ranked by the level of risk they 
                                                 
87 Daniel J. Goldstein, “Amid Cyber Threat to your Business Data, Trust but Verify Third-Party 
Processing,” Mortgage Banking, July 2015, 85. 
88 Kroll, “Are Your Business Partners Letting in the Hackers,” 64. 
89 Goldstein, “Amid Cyber Threat to your Business Data, Trust but Verify Third-Party Processing,” 
85. 
90 “Working with third-parties: Make Security a Priority,” SC Magazine: For IT Security 
Professionals (UK Edition), July-August 2014, 8. http://www.scmagazineuk.com/working-with-third-
parties-make-security-a-priority/article/357460/. 
91 Goldstein, “Amid Cyber Threat to your Business Data, Trust but Verify Third-Party Processing,” 
86. 
92 Ibid., 86. 
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present to the larger network. The larger entity then conducts targeted assessments of a 
certain number of the highest risk third parties on an annual basis.93 
The literature reviewed in this section specifically highlights the risks third-party 
networks can represent. This risk to other organizational networks is the foundational 
problem addressed in this thesis. Third-party network vulnerabilities present a direct risk 
to the DOD just as they do to any other organization that allows third-party connections 
to their networks. So this section serves as the foundation for this research. 
E. U.S. GOVERNMENT CYBER SECURITY ACTIONS 
Since network data breaches have been such a headline grabbing issue in recent 
years, it is not surprising there have been numerous government actions, initiatives, and 
policy changes in an attempt to improve security within both government and civilian 
networks. This work also follows that theme and focuses on how the DOD can induce 
improvement in third-party networks. Specifically, this portion of the study focuses on 
government actions that primarily affect civilian networks. 
The legislative front seems to be an area where there has not been a great deal of 
governmental action. The Data Security Act was a bi-partisan bill introduced in the 
Senate in 2014, and was written to set national standards for securing personal 
information collected by organizations,94 but it ultimately never passed the Senate. The 
bill was introduced in the 2015 Senate session, but as of this writing was still stuck in 
committee so its prospects for passage are low.95 The National Defense Authorization 
Act (NDAA) of 2013, contained language dealing with data and network security of 
cleared defense contractors. The NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to emplace 
procedures to require cleared defense contractors to “rapidly” report to the DOD when 
                                                 
93 Ibid. 
94 Victoria Finkle, “Lawmakers Unveil Data Security Bill, Citing Target Breach,” American Banker, 
January 16, 2014, 1, http://search.proquest.com/docview/1490680935?accountid=12702. 
95 “S. 961: Data Security Act of 2015,” GovTrack.us, Accessed December 2, 2015, 
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their networks were penetrated.96 The NDAA also required procedures be enacted that 
would allow DOD personnel to request and obtain network information from cleared 
defense contractors for post attack forensic analysis.97 Nothing in the NDAA actually sets 
standards or mandates improved contractor network security, which is the issue this 
thesis will address. 
There are initiatives on the scientific front that have the potential to improve 
software security standards. Underwriters Laboratories (UL) is considering expanding its 
scope beyond safety testing and move into software security testing.98 While software is 
not a network, and UL is not a governmental agency, there is a regulatory connection, 
and this could improve and enforce general cyber security standards, thus it is mentioned 
here. Additionally, the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy is 
studying the possibility of establishing an independent laboratory for testing new and 
existing software against established cyber security standards.99 Again this initiative 
could improve the enforcement of cyber security standards. 
The majority of cyber security actions have come from various entities within the 
executive branch. Executive Order 13636 of February 12, 2013 ordered government 
agencies to begin several initiatives. First, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and DOD were directed to establish procedures to begin sharing cyber security 
information with critical infrastructure owners and operators, and it allowed the federal 
government to bring private sector cyber security experts into the federal government 
temporarily.100 The order directed the Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) to establish a framework to mitigate cyber threats to critical 
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infrastructure.101 Lastly, it directed the DOD and General Services Administration (GSA) 
to investigate the feasibility of incorporating cyber security standards into acquisition 
planning and contract administration.102 
As a direct result of EO 13636, DHS created the Critical Infrastructure Cyber 
Community C³ Voluntary Program (originally called Enhanced Cybersecurity Services 
program).103 The program allows critical infrastructure owners and operators to receive 
real time information on cyber security threats and technical assistance in implementing 
the NIST cyber security framework.104 Also, the DOD created the voluntary Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS/IA) program. The 
program is designed to protect unclassified DOD information105 by allowing cleared 
defense contractors to receive unclassified and classified cyber threat information from 
the DOD that they can use to strengthen their networks.106 Lastly, as directed in EO 
13636, NIST created the cyber security framework for critical infrastructure.107 
The Defense Acquisition Regulations Supplement (DFARS) Clause 252.204-7012 
is directly aimed at mitigating risk to government information held by government 
contractors. The clause currently requires defense contractors to adequately protect 
unclassified controlled technical information (UCTI).108 The clause defines adequate 
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protection as contractors implementing network security protocols that meet NIST 
Special Publication (SP) 800–53 security controls, explaining to the contracting officer 
how NIST controls do not apply, or how an alternative measure is equivalent to the NIST 
controls.109 Lastly, it requires reporting to the DOD within 72 hours of any cyber incident 
that affects government UCTI held on the contractor’s network.110  
Related to the DFARS, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) just this 
year has proposed changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) to provide 
guidance to federal agencies on cyber security protections in their contract clauses for 
acquisitions.111 OMB closed the comment period on the proposed changes in September 
2015112 and is now creating a memorandum to officially incorporate the final changes 
into the FAR. The changes will implement new security controls for controlled 
unclassified information (CUI) on contractor networks, cyber incident reporting by the 
contractors, network security assessments of the contractor networks, and requirements to 
follow NIST SP800-171.113 The FAR change also provides specific contracting language 
guidance to federal agencies in the three areas listed previously. 
The ability to properly assess and mitigate risk is another critical aspect of 
network security. The cyber risk equation is a conceptual tool that can assist network 
administrators and owners with this task:114 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  
𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 𝑥 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑥 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡
𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
 
This tool is conceptual, since a network administrator cannot input actual 
numerical values for the independent variables and compute a numerical value for the 
risk. However, it does assist the network administrator in conceptually understanding the 
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overall risk to a network and mitigating that risk to a level acceptable to the network’s 
owning organization.115 A network administrator has the least amount control over the 
threat and impact variables.116 Consequently, the network administrator can mitigate the 
risk to the network by decreasing the number of network vulnerabilities and increasing 
the network’s security controls.117  
The objective of this research is to identify shortfalls in government systems that 
address cyber security, generate system requirements for a new system to fill these 
shortfalls, design a new system that can fill these shortfalls, and make recommendations 
to the DOD on how to build and implement that new system. Consequently, reviewing 
government actions and policy initiatives enacted to date assists in identifying shortfalls 
in the current government system and in generating the new system requirements. Thus, 
the research in this area set the foundation for the system design and recommendations in 
following chapters. 
F. FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CYBER ATTACKS 
Literature in this category supports the cost analysis of the proposed actions in 
Chapter IV. This literature can also assist in decisions on appropriately balancing the 
level of risk the DOD is willing to accept to the DODIN. Estimates on the monetary 
impacts of cyber-attacks vary widely. Sabovich and Borst provide the LoveLetter virus as 
an example of a single virus that circulated worldwide, and had estimated global costs 
that potentially reached over a billion dollars.118 The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) places annual global losses likely around $400 billion, but 
acknowledge even their own estimates vary widely.119 The CSIS research also indicates 
that cyber attack costs for individual nations can range from 0.5 percent to 1 percent of 
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gross domestic product (GDP) on the high end to possibly as low as 0.14 percent on the 
low end of the scale.120 Table 5 from the CSIS study shows a broader view of these 
estimates and compares them against other elicit activity for scale: 
Table 5.   Cyber Attack Costs versus Other Illicit Activities121 
Putting Malicious Cyber Activity in Context 
Criminal Action Estimated Cost Percent of GDP Source 
Global 
Piracy $1 billion to $16 billion 0.008% to 0.02% IMB 
Drug Trafficking $600 billion 5% UNODC 
Global Cyber Activity $300 billion to $1 trillion 0.008% to 0.02% Various 
U.S. Only 
Car Crashes $99 billion to $168 billion 0.7% to 1.2% CDC, AAA 
Pilferage $70 billion to $280 billion 0.5% to 2% NRF 
US Cyber Activity $24 billion to $120 billion 0.2% to 0.8% Various 
 
Additionally, Lloyd’s of London agrees with the $400 billion estimate for global 
cyber attack costs.122 Figure 2 depicts estimates by the Ponemon Institute on the annual 
cost of cyber attacks to the companies participating in its annual cyber crime study and 
indicates the costs to the surveyed companies have increased over the past several years. 
So, even though accurate estimates of cyber attack costs are difficult to obtain, research 
does indicate the costs to companies, national economies, and the global economy are 
significant.  
                                                 
120 Ibid., 16. 
121 Source: CSIS, “The Economic Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage,” 5. 
122 Stephen Gandel, “Lloyd’s CEO: Cyber attacks Cost Companies $400 Billion Every Year,” 
Fortune, January 23, 2015, http://fortune.com/2015/01/23/cyber-attack-insurance-lloyds/. 
 31 
 
Consolidated view, n = 252 separate companies 
Cost expressed in U.S. dollars 
Figure 2.  The Cost of Cyber Crime123 
The accurate estimation of cyber attack costs is difficult for several reasons. The 
CSIS report points out that in many cases organizations may not even realize they have 
been attacked and suffered losses. In other cases, organizations may try to conceal losses 
from cyber attacks. Lastly, in many cases, calculating the value of information stolen in 
cyber attacks is extremely difficult.124 So to make any estimate, analysts must make cost 
assumptions. Thus, the estimates vary because different analysts making different cost 
assumptions produce differing estimates. These estimates include hard costs and soft 
costs. Sabovich and Borst point out that hard costs are generally easier to calculate and 
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include technician costs, hardware replacement costs, and network upgrade costs.125 
Conversely, soft costs are intangible and thus, more difficult to calculate accurately. Soft 
costs can include such components as lost opportunity, lost productivity, and lost person 
hours.126 However, others may include additional cost components such as government 
assessed penalties, litigation costs,127 increased insurance premiums,128 and reputational 
damage.129 Intangible costs to the DOD could be represented by loss of operational 
security of controlled unclassified or classified information represented by the 
TRANSCOM130 and Joint Strike Fighter131 examples discussed previously. Also, other 
authors use different terms to describe cyber attack costs. For example, Bernik describes 
them as direct and indirect costs,132 and the Ponemon Institute uses the monikers 
“internal” and “external” to describe costs;133 as shown in the institute’s visual 
framework of cyber crime costs that is illustrated in Figure 3. This disparity in 
terminology usage as well as differing assumptions and variables, shows why cyber 
attack costs estimates vary so widely.  
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Figure 3.  Cost Framework for Cyber Crime134 
The Ponemon Institute research does seem to indicate that by taking security 
measures, organizations can reduce the costs they suffer due to cyber attacks. For the 
companies participating in the study, those that utilized some form of security 
intelligence system, enterprise security governance practices, and security enabling 
technologies saw the larges overall reduction in costs associated with cyber attacks.135 
The Ponemon study produced Figure 4, which shows the average amount companies 
saved by using a network security intelligence system in six different actions to resolve a 
cyber attack: 
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Cost expressed in millions of U.S. dollars, n = 252 separate companies 
Figure 4.  Activity Cost Comparison and the Use of Security Intelligence 
Technologies136 
The Ponemon study also produced Figure 5, which shows potential cost savings 
companies can realize by utilizing certain network security technologies. The savings 
represented in Figure 5 are not necessarily cumulative, but individually, represent what 
components of network security companies should consider investing in:  
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Savings are expressed in U.S. dollars. Consolidated view, n = 252 separate companies. 
Figure 5.  Cost Savings When Deploying Seven Enabling Technologies137 
Unfortunately, some of these gross cost savings will be negated by the cost of 
deploying these security measures. Organizations must use a cost/benefit approach to 
determine the appropriate type and level of security measures to employ. However, 
Figure 6 illustrates the return-on-investment (ROI) the Ponemon Institute calculated, 
using both the cost savings and cost of the technology investment, these companies 
would achieve if they implemented the following security technologies: 
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Consolidated view, n = 252 separate companies 
Figure 6.  Estimated ROI for Seven Categories of Enabling Security 
Technologies138 
This research is an important element in support of the proposed 
recommendations because it shows that investing in network security can pay for itself 
and provide organizations with an overall net cost savings from cyber attacks. Showing 
that organizations can realize cost savings through network security practices, supports 
the recommendations for the DOD to influence stronger network security in third-party 
networks. The DOD’s influence comes from showing third-party network owners net cost 
savings from employing stronger network security practices. 
In research related to the cost of cyber attacks, some authors have also proposed 
theories on why many organizations do not invest more heavily in their network security. 
Their arguments claim that even while conservative estimates indicate the cost of cyber 
attacks is very substantial, it is still actually only a small percentage of many 
organizations’ bottom lines. Hackett uses work done by Benjamin Dean, at Columbia 
University’s School of International and Public Affairs, to show that costs associated 
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with cyber attacks usually amount to less than 1 percent of most companies’ earnings, 
which correlates with work by other authors noted earlier.139 However, when other things 
such as insurance payouts and tax write offs are considered, the actual cost to companies 
becomes even less.140 Hackett uses the well-known Sony, Home Depot, and Target 
network breaches as examples to describe the actual scale of the costs associated with the 
attacks to the companies’ overall bottom lines. He uses a quote from Sony’s financial 
forecast, “Sony believes that the impact of the cyberattack on its consolidated results for 
the fiscal year ending March 31, 2015 will not be material.”141 Hackett also uses statistics 
from Dean that show, when mitigating factors such as insurance policies and tax breaks 
are figured in, the breaches at Home Depot and Target will represent approximately 0.01 
percent and 0.1percent of their annual sales in 2014, respectively.142 Organizations may 
feel these costs are less than the cost of investing in stronger security, especially when 
considering cost mitigating factors. Consequently, instead of correcting their poor 
security, many organizations choose to overlook it or use insurance in an attempt to 
mitigate the potential negative financial impacts that stem from it. Gandel notes that the 
insurance industry has seen insurance premiums collected on cyber policies grow from 
less than $1 billion to over $2.5 billion in just three years.143 These actions may well 
prove short-sighted because, as already noted, there are many components to the costs of 
cyber attacks, all of which may not be readily apparent in cost estimates and company 
financial reports. 
Regardless of the lack of hard estimates, people should intuitively recognize that 
the overall cost of cyber-attacks to the United States, in terms of governmental, corporate, 
and individual costs are enormous. Thwarting cyber-attacks through improved network 
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security is a key element to reducing these costs. The information gathered from literature 
in this area provides evidence that the strategies to improve third-party network security 
will be cost effective for both the third-party network owners and the DOD. 
G. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING APPROACH 
Systems engineering is an important field in the modern world and in particular to 
the DOD. It is the engineering method society uses to create modern complex systems 
used for purposes in everyday life and modern warfare. However, a description and 
working definition of a “system” is essential to understanding systems engineering. The 
International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines a system as: 
A “system” is a construct or collection of different elements that together 
produce results not obtainable by the elements alone. The elements, or 
parts, can include people, hardware, software, facilities, policies, and 
documents; that is, all things required to produce system-level results. The 
results include system-level qualities, properties, characteristics, functions, 
behavior, and performance. The value added by the system as a whole, 
beyond that contributed independently by the parts, is primarily created by 
the relationship among the parts; that is, how they are interconnected.144  
Blanchard asserts that a system also has a number of general characteristics. 
These characteristics are a system is made of a combination of resources, falls into some 
sort of hierarchy, contains components and/or subsystems, and has a functional 
purpose.145 To further describe systems, Blanchard breaks systems down into several 
different categories. The categories of systems he lists are natural and manmade, physical 
and conceptual, static and dynamic, closed-loop and open-loop.146  
Systems can also be joined or integrated with other systems to form a relationship 
called a system-of-systems (SOS). Examples of SOS would be a transportation system, a 
large scale communications system, or a complex DOD weapon system, such as an 
aircraft carrier. Blanchard provides the following as the definition of a SOS: 
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A collection of component systems that produce results unachievable by 
the individual systems alone. Each system in the SOS structure is likely to 
be operational in its own right, as well be contributing in the 
accomplishment of some higher-level mission requirement. The life cycles 
of the individual systems may vary somewhat as there will be additions 
and deletions at different times, as  long as the mission requirements for 
any given system are met. Thus, there may be some new developments in 
progress at the same time as other elements are being retired for 
disposal.147  
Blanchard, in Figure 7, provides a visual depiction of example SOSs:  
 
Figure 7.  Multiple Systems (SOS)148 
This understanding of a system and a SOS, allows the reader to grasp the systems 
engineering process. Several definitions of systems engineering are available. First, 
INCOSE has defined it as: 
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Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means to enable 
the realization of successful systems. It focuses on defining customer 
needs and required functionality early in the development cycle, 
documenting requirements, and then proceeding with design synthesis and 
system validation while considering the complete problem. Systems 
engineering considers both the business and technical needs of all 
customers with the goal of providing a quality product that meets the user 
needs.149  
The DOD has its own definition of systems engineering, provided by the Defense 
Acquisition Guide Book:  
Systems engineering (SE) is a methodical and disciplined approach for the 
specification, design, development, realization, technical management, 
operations, and retirement of a system. The enabling system elements 
provide the means for delivering a capability into service, keeping it in 
service, or ending its service and may include those processes or products 
necessary for developing, producing, testing, deploying, and sustaining the 
system.150 
These definitions show that systems engineering cannot be thought of in the same 
manner as other hard engineering disciplines. Systems engineering is focused on the 
design and development processes required to bring a system from being simply a 
requirement to an actual functional system.151 A critical component of good systems 
engineering is “a ‘top-down/bottom-up’ development approach”152 that uses feedback 
loops at each stage that allow for continuous design, product, and process 
improvement.153 This approach provides the “top down” direction from higher level 
leadership during the design and initial construction phases, as well as, bottom up 
refinement in product and process improvement during later phases. Figure 8 depicts this 
process with its associated feedback loops: 
                                                 
149 Ibid., 17. 
150 Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 158 (2013). 
151 Blanchard, System Engineering Management, 21. 
152 Ibid., 18. 
153 Ibid., 31. 
 41 
 
Figure 8.  Top-Down/Bottom-Up System Development Process154 
The systems engineering process should be applied through all phases of a 
system’s life cycle. By doing this, systems can be continually assessed to provide 
feedback on recommendations for changes to the system in order to keep systems 
optimally functional.155 Figure 9 shows how the systems engineering process should 
meld with the system life cycle:  
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Figure 9.  The System Engineering Process in the Life Cycle156 
                                                 
156 Source: Ibid., 52. 
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In the modern technological world, and specifically in the DOD, many new 
systems will become part of an SOS. Few systems operate in a standalone fashion. 
Blanchard contends that one of the primary systems engineering objectives is to ensure 
leadership and provide guidance during the system design phase.157 A critical design 
element is ensuring the system can effectively interface and is interoperable with other 
external systems as either part of an integrated SOS or as standalone systems operating in 
the same environment.158 Figure 10 graphically depicts this system interoperability 
requirement: 
 
Figure 10.  System-of-Systems Integration and Interoperability Requirements159 
Good systems engineering practices become increasingly important as modern 
systems grow ever more complex and are integrated into more complex SOSs. This 
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review provided important background information on the systems engineering 
methodology, which is used to develop the recommendations in this thesis. The 
recommended actions to influence improved security postures in third-party networks are 
viewed as individual systems. The systems engineering methodology will ensure the 
compatibility of the recommended actions within the larger DODIN SOS.  
H. CONCLUSION 
Third-party computer networks represent a risk to DOD computer networks. As 
the DOD is operationally reliant on its networks, third-party networks also represent a 
risk to DOD operations. The literature review indicates that the government is taking 
actions to mitigate these threats in several different ways. The DOD and DHS respective 
cyber threat information sharing and anti-terrorism technology programs and clauses in 
federal government acquisition regulations are the most applicable for the purposes of 
this thesis. These specific areas are analyzed in further detail in following chapters. 
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III. EXISTING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
One of this chapter’s objectives will be to demonstrate that precedence exists 
within the federal government that can be used to inform and strengthen this thesis’s 
overall recommendations. These precedents are important to this work for several 
reasons, but most importantly they provide a model that can be used to structure 
recommended actions. Also, these precedents may increase the probability of the DOD 
implementing the recommended actions because they demonstrate similar actions have 
been taken in the past, thus the actions are feasible and a path to follow in implementing 
them has already been created. The literature review for this thesis, contained in Chapter 
II, demonstrates that precedence does exist in the form of two existing federal 
government programs: the DHS Safety Act Program and the DOD Cyber Security/
Information Assurance (CS/IA) Program. This chapter delves into the detailed aspects of 
the programs’ governing policies, structures, and boundaries. It also highlights how 
portions of these two programs can be used as exemplars to design a program that meets 
the system requirements to address the DOD’s operational need. This operational need is 
the ability to influence the security posture of third-party networks, which may contact or 
connect to the DODIN. 
B. DHS SAFETY ACT PROGRAM 
As a result of terror attacks on September 11, 2001, the Safety Act was enacted in 
conjunction with the Homeland Security Act of 2002.160 The government believed that 
following the attacks, many companies were fearful that they could be held liable and 
face severe litigation if their products or services were employed in a civilian 
environment where damage to property and people occurred as a result of terror 
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attacks.161 This fear of liability had the potential to stagnate critical anti-terrorism 
technology development. Thus, Congress wrote and approved the Safety Act to shield 
companies who were developing and deploying certain anti-terrorism technologies from 
at least a portion of that litigation risk. Ultimately, “the SAFETY Act provides incentives 
for the development and deployment of anti-terrorism technologies by creating a system 
of ‘risk management’ and a system of ‘litigation management.’”162  
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) provides the Safety Act’s formal title: 
“The Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act of 2002.”163 
According to the Federal Register, the Safety Act’s primary purpose is to “ensure that the 
threat of liability does not deter potential manufacturers or sellers of anti-terrorism 
technologies from developing, deploying, and commercializing technologies that could 
save lives.”164 The Act provides several different liability protections, such as exclusive 
jurisdiction in Federal Court for suits against sellers of a Qualified Anti-Terrorism 
Technology (QATT), limitation of the liability to the amount of terrorism insurance the 
seller is carrying, a limitation on the amount of non-economic damages, a total 
prohibition on punitive damages and any pre-judgment interest, a reduction in the award 
amount to the claimant by the amount of any other compensation received by the 
claimant, a presumption the seller is entitled to the ‘government contractor’s 
defense.’”165 The government contractor’s defense makes the seller immune from 
liability for claims where the Safety Act applies. Furthermore, the act ensures that any 
liability that does exist does not extend past the seller of the QATT. If litigation were 
brought against others in the supply chain of a QATT, the costs would ultimately trickle 
back to the seller and serve to suppress initiative in developing new QATTs. So the Act 
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prevents suits from being brought against suppliers to the QATT seller or QATT buyers 
and downstream users.166 However, as DHS notes, the Safety Act protections only apply 
in the case of an actual terrorism event.167 
Under the Safety Act, QATT sellers are required to obtain liability insurance for 
their approved technologies. The amount of liability insurance the QATT seller must 
obtain will be included in the QATT designation and certified by the Under Secretary for 
Science and Technology of the Department of Homeland Security.168 Several factors are 
included in the determination of the actual amount of liability insurance the QATT seller 
must obtain, but in general, it is based on policies available on the insurance market, 
amounts that sellers of comparable products hold, and the amounts of insurance the seller 
held prior to the Safety Act Program application. However, the Under Secretary cannot 
require a seller to obtain any type or amount of insurance that is not available on the 
general insurance market or that would significantly skew the price of the seller’s 
QATT.169  
A wide range of products and services can be designated as a QATT and covered 
underneath the Safety Act. CFR defines a QATT as “any Technology (including 
information technology) designed, developed, modified, procured, or sold for the purpose 
of preventing, detecting, identifying, or deterring acts of terrorism or limiting the harm 
such acts might otherwise cause.”170 Examples of technologies eligible to be covered by 
the Safety Act include threat and vulnerability assessment services, blast mitigation 
services, sensors, vaccines, metal detectors, data mining software, and many others.171 
Once any of these technologies are approved as a QATT, their sellers and buyers will 
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received liability protections if that QATT is involved in a designated terrorism event, 
including cyber terrorism. 
The Safety Act Program’s structure contains two principle levels of liability 
protection: Designation and Certification.172 The Designation Level also contains a 
secondary level called Developmental Testing & Evaluation (DT&E) Designation.173 
Figure 11 provides a graphical depiction of the Safety Act Program’s liability protection 
levels: 
 
Figure 11.  Safety Act Liability Levels174 
                                                 
172 Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology Directorate, Office of SAFETY Act 
Implementation, SAFETY Act 101Briefing: The Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies 
(SAFETY) Act of 2002, 6. 
173 Ibid. 
174 Source: Ibid. 
 49 
As described previously, the Designation Level provides the liability cap 
protections. Numerous criteria exist for a technology to qualify for the Designation 
Level: prior U.S. Government use or proven utility and effectiveness, the technology is 
available for immediate deployment, high probability the technology will not be deployed 
unless Safety Act protections are applied, magnitude of risk to the public if the 
technology is not used, and others.175 The secondary DT&E Designation Level is for 
technologies that are in the testing phase and not ready for operational deployment. This 
subset receives the same protections as the Designation Level but only can be applied to 
testing and evaluation events at a limited number of locations.176 The Certification Level 
is for technologies that have already qualified under the Designation Level and have also 
been demonstrated to perform as intended, shown to conform to the sellers’ 
specifications, and proven safe for use in the manner and environments intended.177 The 
Certification Level provides the same liability protections as the Designation Level, but 
also provides the government contractor defense against liability claims and puts the 
technology on the government’s approved product list (APL) or approved services list 
(ASL).178 Table 6 provides a summary of these liability protection levels: 
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Table 6.   Safety Act Liability Protections Summary179 
 
 
Since the Safety Act’s enactment, it has been heavily utilized by private sector 
anti-terrorism technology producers. As of January 2016, DHS has qualified over 800 
technologies under the Safety Act Program at the different levels.180 Data suggests that 
private sector use in also increasing. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, 87 technologies received 
Safety Act protections compared to 65 in FY 2014.181 Additionally, the QATTs added in 
FY 2015 alone represented approximately $7.5 billion in revenue to the companies 
involved.182 This data indicates the Safety Act Program has been successful in providing 
effective incentives for the private sector to continue innovating and developing new anti-
terrorism technologies. 
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C. DOD DIB CS/IA PROGRAM 
The DOD initially established the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security/
Information Assurance (CS/IA) Program in 2007 under the DOD Chief Information 
Officer (CIO),183 and in October 2013 made it a permanent program within the DOD.184 
The program is governed by DOD Instruction, Number 5205.13.185 The DOD established 
the program because it recognized that cyber threats to unclassified networks within the 
DIB represented a severe risk to DOD information and ultimately national security. 
According to the CFR, the program’s purpose is to “enhance and supplement DIB 
participants’ capabilities to safeguard DOD information that resides on, or transits DIB 
unclassified information systems.”186 So the program’s primary focus is on DOD CUI 
and UCTI that contacts DIB networks.  
Overall, the DIB CS/IA Program contains several different elements that 
contribute to accomplishing the program’s purpose. It shares DOD unclassified and 
classified cyber threat information, as well as, computer network defense (CND) and IA 
best practices with DIB participants. The program develops standard reporting 
procedures for DIB cyber incident reporting and develops mechanisms for the DOD to 
assist the DIB participants in conducting cyber security self-assessments. It also develops 
procedures for the DOD to assist DIB participants in cyber attack damage assessments 
and network remediation.187  
However, at its core, the DIB CS/IA Program is centered on information sharing. 
It utilizes bilateral information sharing, where the DOD provides the DIB program 
participants with information on current cyber threats and IA best practices to enhance 
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their ability to protect DOD CUI and UCTI. In return, the participating companies 
provide the DOD with reports on certain cyber intrusions into their networks.188 This 
information sharing arrangement is formalized in a standardized, bilateral framework 
agreement (FA), which is signed by both the DIB participant and the DOD, thereby 
legally implementing the agreement’s requirements.189 The program is entirely voluntary 
for DIB participants,190 and the FA can be cancelled at any time, by either the DIB 
participant or the DOD. The DOD also recognizes a critical element in the success of this 
program is the sensitive nature of the information being shared by both the DIB 
participants and the DOD, and the importance of protecting that information from 
unauthorized use or disclosure.191  
The DOD has created a DIB Collaborative Information Sharing Environment 
(DCISE), which is the operational hub for the DIB CS/IA Program’s information sharing. 
The DCISE is operationally controlled through the DOD cyber crime center (DC3), 
which hosts the DCISE on a website: http://dibnet.dod.mil/.192 This is how the DOD 
promulgates information on the program, handles applications, facilitates the bilateral 
information exchange of unclassified and classified threat information, and analyzes 
attacks to assist developing mitigation strategies in near real time with the DIB 
participants.193 The DOD has also set up the DIB CS/IA Program Office to be the 
overarching point of contact for the program.194  
To be eligible to participate in the DIB CS/IA Program, a DIB company must 
meet several requirements. Companies must have DOD-approved medium assurance 
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certificates to allow encrypted unclassified information sharing, have an existing active 
Facility Security Clearance (FCL) approved for classified information if they are to 
receive it, have a communication security (COMSEC) account, and have access to the 
DOD’s secure voice and data transmission systems. Additionally, the companies must 
own or operate a covered DIB system. Lastly, they must execute an FA with the DOD.195  
As the DIB CS/IA Program is voluntary, the DIB participant is in no way 
obligated to use the information shared by the government. Consequently, any action the 
participant takes is their own decision to do so, and they are responsible for any costs 
associated with those actions.196 These costs can include those associated with 
identifying, analyzing, and reporting cyber incidents, as well as costs to remediate the 
participant’s network.197 Additionally, being a voluntary participant in the program does 
not provide the company with any additional financial incentives or any special 
advantage competing for government contracts. In fact, Title 32 of the CFR directly 
states that the current program does not offer any contracting advantage for participating 
DIB companies.198 
D. ANALYSIS 
The DOD CS/IA Program’s current elements work to enhance network security 
and provide some small amount of incentive for DIB companies to join the program. 
These elements are both useful and important, and they should remain as part of any new 
proposed program. However, the DOD could make the program much more effective by 
making several changes to it. First, the program’s scope is too narrow. The program 
currently only includes DIB companies that have covered networks that contain or pass 
CUI and UCTI.199 It should be broadened so it is open to any companies whose networks 
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interact with the DODIN or that handle operationally relevant DOD information. Second, 
the program should be restructured to incorporate more incentive for DIB companies to 
both join the program and improve the security posture of their networks. The DOD 
should restructure the DOD DIB CS/IA Program to a layered or tiered structure and 
incorporate additional elements similar to those in the Safety Act Program, such as 
liability protections, adding products to approved purchase lists, and giving program 
participants added weight in contract bidding evaluations could increase the incentive for 
DIB companies to join. 
Since the Safety Act Program already contains these elements, it serves as a 
model for how to modify the DOD DIB CS/IA Program. Adding liability protections to 
the DOD DIB CS/IA Program would almost certainly require legislative action to codify 
those protections into law. However, since legislative action was taken for the Safety Act 
to promote anti-terrorism technologies, it could also be taken for the DOD DIB CS/IA 
Program to promote cyber security. Additionally, the Federal Government and DOD have 
the ability to add the products of program participants to approved purchase lists and give 
added weight to contract bids from program participants during the bid evaluation 
process. 
E. SUMMARY 
The DOD DIB CS/IA Program was a starting point for the DOD to reach out to 
and assist the private sector in improving its network security. Information sharing on 
current threats, incident reporting, network security assessment assistance, threat 
mitigation assistance, damage assessment assistance, and network remediation assistance 
are all valuable tools in influencing the network security of these private organizations. 
However, the application of the program is too narrow. Thus, presently, the DIB CS/IA 
Program does not have the capability to influence all private sector third-party networks 
that contact some part of the DODIN. Many material and service providers for the DOD 
would not qualify for the program, yet their networks still contact the DODIN in some 
way. That contact is all that is required to provide an attack vector to an adversary.  
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Additionally, the DOD DIB CS/IA Program could do more to further incentivize 
improved network security of private sector third-party networks. The literature review 
provided evidence that companies are already recognizing the litigation risk they face due 
to network security breaches. The Safety Act Program’s liability protections, APLs, and 
ASLs provide a powerful incentive to join the program. Many companies can gain a 
substantial advantage in their market when their products and services can legally short 
cut through the normal governmental contracting and acquisition process. As noted 
previously, current data suggests these incentives work, as over 800 companies have 
joined the Safety Act Program since its inception. 
Overall, the DOD DIB CS/IA Program can be made much more effective at 
influencing the security of private sector third-party networks by retaining its current 
elements and also broadening its scope to incorporate certain Safety Act Program 
elements and other non-Safety Act related elements. This thesis’s next chapter will serve 
to specifically analyze the elements that should be incorporated into the DIB CS/IA 
Program to improve its effectiveness. 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS TO THE DOD 
DIB CS/IA PROGRAM 
A. OVERVIEW 
The DOD DIB CS/IA Program can be significantly enhanced by restructuring it 
into a two-tiered, incentive-based information network security program. This 
restructured program is called the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program. Each tier in this 
program contains different levels of security requirements and incentive elements for 
participants. Its proposed structure will prove crucial to incentivize improved information 
network security posture within the DIB. The enhanced program improves DIB network 
security by convincing DIB participants to voluntarily agree to meet the program’s 
network security requirements in exchange for incentive elements that provide financial 
benefits and DOD assistance in improving their network security. Improved network 
security within the DIB reduces the threat vectors into the DODIN, thereby improving the 
DODIN’s overall security and reducing its operational risk.  
The DOD states that it expects up to 10 percent of the 8,500 covered defense 
contractors could ultimately join the current program, but actual program enrollment is 
currently less than half of that amount.200 This low percentage of participants plus the 
current program eligibility requirements limiting potential participants demonstrates a 
shortcoming of the current program’s design. Conversely, as discussed in Chapter III, the 
DHS Safety Act Program has demonstrated the ability of a government, incentive-based 
program to shape the actions of private companies in ways that benefit anti-terrorism 
activities. The Safety Act Program also clearly demonstrates the ability to generate 
interest and attract participants as indicated by the more than 800 technologies already 
approved for enrollment and data showing that application and approval rates are also 
increasing. While directly comparing these two programs is of arguable value, an indirect 
comparison indicates the more incentivized Safety Act Program is generating more 
participation, thus influencing more actions. Consequently, the Safety Act Program’s 
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incentive based success provides evidence that a more powerful incentive based DIB CS/
IA Program could reach more companies and better shape their actions to improve 
network security. Thus, the Safety Act Program is used as the model for the Enhanced 
DOD CS/IA Program’s proposed structure.  
B. PROPOSED DOD CS/IA PROGRAM STRUCTURE 
The enhanced program contains two tiers: basic and advanced. These two tiers 
include differing levels of incentives and network security requirements. The enhanced 
DOD CS/IA Program has two tiers as an optimized solution between flexibility for the 
participants and simplicity in program structure. Going back to the Safety Act Program as 
the model, it utilizes two primary levels with a sub-level underneath its base level. This 
structure has proven successful in attracting companies to the Safety Act Program 
initially, and then incentivizing them to move to the higher level. The Safety Act Program 
Office acknowledges companies enter the program at the lower Designation Level to 
receive the basic level of protections, with some willing to move up to the Certification 
Level to receive its increased protections and benefits. This two-level system seems to 
provide participants with enough flexibility to make the program work to their benefit 
without creating undue complexity.  
One key aspect of the original DIB CS/IA Program will remain unchanged—it 
will remain completely voluntary. Program participants will be free to withdraw from the 
program at any time. The DOD cannot mandate that private companies join or remain a 
part of a DOD-run program, especially one that could have financial implications for 
those companies. Thus, the enhanced program must remain voluntary. DIB companies 
are also free to choose the program tier that is the best fit for their organization and are 
also free to change tiers in order to find that best fit. The DOD can encourage and assist 
participants to reach the advanced tier to achieve its enhanced network security benefits, 
but the DOD should not pressure participants to join the advanced tier if they otherwise 
would not choose to do so. Doing so would go against the program’s voluntary nature. 
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1. The Basic Tier 
The basic tier will be the initial entry level into the DOD DIB CS/IA Program. 
Participants at this tier will be required to adopt basic security practices already required 
of DIB companies that deal in CUI and UCTI and have contracts with the DOD. As 
previously noted in Chapter II, the DOD must follow DFARS Clause 252.204-7012 when 
contracting with DIB companies.201 This DFARS Clause mandates companies abide by 
network security practices set forth in NIST SP 800–53: “Security and Privacy Controls 
for Federal Information Systems and Organizations.”202 As also noted in Chapter II, 
forthcoming changes to the FAR will also require DIB companies to abide by security 
practices outlined in NIST SP 800–171: “Protecting Controlled Unclassified Information 
in Non-federal Information Systems and Organizations.”203 Since the network security 
practices contained in these two NIST publications are or soon will be required for DIB 
companies dealing in CUI and UCTI, it makes logical sense to set these the security 
practices as the requirements for the basic tier. Lastly, network security configuration 
practices set forth in NIST SP 800–70: “Security Configuration Checklists for IT 
Products” will also be used to set security requirements for the basic tier. Setting the 
NIST practices as requirements for the enhanced program is one of the crucial changes 
that will improve network security in the DIB participants’ networks. Additionally, the 
basic tier will also retain the reporting requirements from the participant to the DOD as 
contained in the original program and required in the DFARS and FAR. This leads to 
another critical change to the enhanced program—validation that program participants 
are meeting the program’s network security and reporting requirements. 
The enhanced program’s validation requirement comes in the form of a network 
security self-assessment the participants must complete, certify, and return to the DOD. 
To facilitate this self-assessment, the DOD will create a form or checklist that is based on 
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the previously mentioned NIST special publications and the reporting requirements from 
the FAR, DFARS, and the current DIB CS/IA program. Appendix B provides an example 
of how this self-assessment form might be constructed and the security controls it should 
contain. When DIB companies apply for the program, part of the application process is to 
use this self-assessment form to guide them through the self-assessment process. The 
DOD will provide technical assistance in using the enhanced program’s self-assessment 
form and completing the self-assessment if requested by the applicants. As discussed 
previously, the current DOD DIB CS/IA Program is authorized to provide some 
assistance to DIB participants in conducting network security self-assessments.204 Thus, 
the authorization to provide assistance in using this self-assessment form already exists. 
In the enhanced program, this assistance will be provided through the program office by 
trained and specifically-designated personnel. The assistance will consist of answering 
questions about what the security control items on the form specifically mean, how to 
procedurally complete the form, and recommendations on how to apply the form to the 
applicants’ specific networks. Upon completion of the self-assessment, the applying 
companies will certify its completion and that their networks meet the security standards 
set in the assessment form. If areas exist in which their networks do not meet these 
security standards, the companies must also submit corrective action plans to the DOD 
with the certified self-assessments as part of their applications. Companies will be 
required to certify the substandard aspects of their networks have been corrected before 
the application process is finalized. If network intrusions are discovered during the self-
assessment, the application process will halt until the applicants remediate their networks. 
The applicants are responsible for this network remediation cost.  
To guard against applicant companies misrepresenting themselves on the network 
security self-assessments, the enhanced program will allow the DOD to spot check 
participant companies to verify the accuracy of their submitted assessment forms. The 
DOD can choose to do the self-assessment verification via organic DOD capability or 
contracted service. The DOD will be responsible for bearing the cost of the self-
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assessment verification. Additionally, as part of the enhanced program, the DOD will 
specifically verify the accuracy of the self-assessment form of any networks that sustain a 
verified breach, which affects DOD information or the DODIN. If the program 
participants are found to have misrepresented themselves on the assessment or failed to 
maintain the required network security standards following the assessment, the DOD can 
decide to drop them from the program. Also, if the situation warrants, the DOD could 
decide to take further action against the participants, such as barring them from receiving 
future DOD contracts. Lastly, the network security self-assessment will be an annual 
requirement for participants to remain an active member of the Enhanced DOD CS/IA 
Program’s basic tier. The NIST SP 800–115: “Technical Guide to Information Security 
Testing and Assessment,” recommends that an organization’s network assessment policy 
be reviewed annually,205 and completing an annual self-assessment falls in line with this 
NIST best practice.  
The incentive for DIB companies to join the program at the basic tier will come 
from several different program elements. First, the original program’s core element, the 
bilateral information sharing on current cyber threats in real time will remain at this tier. 
The information sharing will continue to be processed through the DCISE, which will 
continue to be hosted by the DC3. As with the current program, DIB participants will be 
able to receive classified threat information if they are cleared and certified to receive and 
store classified information. This program element will allow the DOD to keep the DIB 
participants updated on the current cyber threats the DOD tracks so the participants can 
better prepare their networks to defend against those threats. So this program element 
provides a free cyber threat intelligence source for the DIB participants. 
Secondly, the enhanced program will provide continued assistance to participants 
who wish to conduct vulnerability assessments on their own networks. To do this, the 
program will offer a repository of leading network and vulnerability scanners: Nessus, 
SuperScan, NMap, NetClarity, Retina, and others. Many of these scanners are freeware, 
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but a few such, as the Nessus206 and Retina207 scanners, must be purchased. Through the 
program, the DOD will offer the scanners to the enhanced program participants. The 
freeware scanners can be downloaded directly from the Internet. The DOD can purchase 
licenses for the scanners that are not freeware and then provide those licenses to program 
participants. Tenable, who produces the Nessus scanner, and Beyond Trust, who 
produces the Retina scanner, sell blocks of product licenses. As a separate option, the 
DOD can work with companies providing the scanner licenses, in order to offer the 
licenses at a discounted rate to the program participants. Through the program office, the 
DOD will also provide technical assistance to the participants on using these tools. The 
assistance will include instructions on how to use the tools, recommendations on how to 
apply the tools to participants’ networks, and limited trouble shooting advice. 
Third, the DOD makes participation in the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program an 
evaluation criterion used in the bid evaluation process for DOD contracts. This program 
participation criterion will not be a mandatory criterion for a company to be awarded a 
DOD contract, but merely garners participants increased consideration of their contract 
bids. Participants earn this increased contract bid consideration because through program 
participation they demonstrate to the DOD that they maintain a known, minimum level of 
network security vice non-participants whose network security level is unknown. This 
known security level reduces risk to the DOD. Thus, being an Enhanced DOD CS/IA 
Program participant could offer companies a competitive advantage over competitors 
when bidding on government contracts. In turn, this competitive advantage acts as an 
incentive to draw companies into program participation. 
Lastly, the enhanced program’s liability cap protection is the only program 
element that requires support from outside the DOD. Specifically, the DOD has no 
authority to set liability caps, so Congress will have to pass legislation to enact this 
portion of the enhanced program. However, doing so provides a significant incentive for 
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DIB companies to join the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program and adopt its improved 
network security practices. As discussed in Chapter II, organizations are paying rapidly 
increasing insurance premium costs, which indicate they see litigation resulting from 
cyber attacks as a significant financial threat. The liability cap protections in the 
enhanced program will be closely modeled after the liability caps on anti-terrorism 
technologies in the Safety Act Program. Consequentially, the Enhanced DOD CS/IA 
Program participants’ legal liability will be capped at an amount equal the maximum 
amount of cyber attack insurance the participants are carrying. As with the Safety Act 
Program, the participants in this restructured DOD program will be required to carry a 
certain amount of insurance. The amount the participants are required to carry will be 
determined on a case-by-case basis and based on numerous factors. The two most critical 
factors are 1) to avoid artificially inflating the price of the participants’ goods and 
services by setting the required policy amounts too high and, 2) to align the required 
policy amount with policies comparable organizations are taking out on the open 
insurance market. Ultimately, the DOD will set the policy amount each participant will 
be required to carry based on the evaluation of all the relevant factors. This determination 
will take place during the enhanced program application process, and stated clearly in the 
final agreement signed by both parties. This liability cap protection will only apply to 
claims made by third parties affected by cyber attacks targeted at the participants’ 
networks due to their relationship with the DOD. 
2. The Advanced Tier 
The advanced tier represents the higher level of the Enhanced DOD CS/IA 
Program in terms of the level of network security requirements the participants must meet 
and the incentives offered through its program elements. To apply for the advanced tier, 
program participants are required to have already applied for and been found qualified to 
participate at the basic tier. Consequentially, advanced tier participants are required to 
meet the basic tier network security requirements and will receive the basic tier incentive 
elements while participating in the advanced tier. The advanced tier then incorporates 
more advanced network security practices into the program while also providing 
additional incentive elements. 
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DIB companies that desire to participate in the DOD DIB CS/IA Program’s 
advanced tier are required to have a qualified independent third party conduct security 
assessments on their networks. These third-party assessments of the DIB companies’ 
networks are accomplished via two avenues. First, the applicants must have an 
independent third party validate the network security self-assessment completed for the 
basic tier application. Second, the applicants are required to have the independent third 
party conduct thorough network vulnerability assessments and penetration testing on their 
networks in accordance with NIST SP 800–115: “Technical Guide to Information 
Security Testing and Assessment.” The applicants are also required to submit a corrective 
action plan, which addresses vulnerabilities discovered during the vulnerability 
assessment process and the anticipated timeline to correct or mitigate those 
vulnerabilities in order to finalize the application process. The applicants will remain in 
an initial probationary status until they confirm to the DOD the vulnerabilities have been 
corrected, mitigated, or otherwise appropriately addressed in accordance with their 
corrective action plan. The applicants are also responsible for any costs associated with 
correcting the vulnerabilities on their networks. For DIB participants to remain enrolled 
in the advanced tier, they are required to periodically repeat network vulnerability 
assessments and penetration testing events. The author recommends the DOD set the 
period for periodic reassessments within the range of two to four years. A period set too 
short both creates an overly onerous and costly requirement, which may discourage 
participants. A period set too long allows for too much potential degradation in the 
network security posture. Current best practice guidelines do not set any specific 
frequency for network vulnerability reassessments. The NIST SP 800–53 states the 
frequency for vulnerability assessments and penetration testing is user defined,208 and the 
Center for Internet Security (CIS) Critical Security Controls for Cyber Defense states that 
penetration testing frequency should be “regular.”209 Any network breach or intrusion 
that is discovered during the third-party assessment process halts the participants’ 
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advanced tier application process and causes the participants to be suspended from the 
program until the intrusion is remediated. The participants’ are responsible for any 
network remediation costs.  
The elements that create incentive for the enhanced program at the advanced tier 
build on those elements found in the basic tier. First, the DOD will offer to share the 
costs for the network vulnerability assessments and penetration testing to help ease the 
DIB participants’ burden for these requirements. Numerous options exist to implement 
this incentive element. As examples, the DOD can set a flat rate cost percentage for all 
participants, set a cost ceiling the DOD will not exceed, or create a sliding scale 
percentage based on the participants’ annual profit levels. Easing the participants’ out of 
pocket cost burden for the assessments will increase the likelihood that DIB companies 
will decide to participate in the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program at the advanced tier. 
The advanced tier’s second incentive element is DOD provided network 
remediation assistance for participants whose networks are breached by cyber attacks. As 
noted in Chapter III, the current DOD DIB CS/IA Program already contains provisions to 
provide technical remediation assistance to participants whose networks have been 
breached, and this will continue in the enhanced program. The technical capacity to 
effectively enable this incentive element could be created and reside organically within 
the DOD in either the DC3 or the DIB CS/IA Program Office, or it could be a contracted 
service. Additionally, in cases where attacks are determined to be directly linked to the 
program participants’ relationship with the DOD, the enhanced program can also offer to 
share network remediation costs with the participants. However, the DOD will ensure 
that the participants are compliant in all aspects of the enhanced program prior to 
fulfilling this element and sharing any remediation costs. The DOD can choose to 
implement the network remediation cost sharing in a variety of ways. This cost sharing 
will serve to provide important assistance to the DIB participants, and also greatly 
strengthen the relationship between the participants and the DOD. 
The creation of APLs and ASLs for DIB participants is the next element 
incorporated into the advanced tier. As discussed in Chapter III, within the Safety Act 
Program, the APLs and ASLs are preapproved purchase lists for products and services. 
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DIB companies who have joined at the advanced tier can have certain products or 
services placed on these preapproved purchase lists so that organizations within the DOD 
can purchase them without having to go through the full DOD contracting process. The 
DOD will have to set criteria on what types of products and services could legally be 
placed on these lists. However, for the companies that could have products and services 
placed on the APLs and ASLs, this program element could result in a significant market 
advantage over competitors and thus be a strong incentive for the program. As with the 
Safety Act Program, these APLs and ASLs could potentially be extended beyond the 
DOD and also applied to other federal government agencies, thereby magnifying this 
element’s overall incentive effect.  
The last program element in the advanced tier is to further strengthen the liability 
protections for the participants. This element is again modeled after the Safety Act 
Program in that, at this tier, program participants could be eligible for the government 
contractor defense in litigation proceedings. Eligibility for the government contractor 
defense gives the program participants liability immunity from third-party claims 
resulting from cyber attacks that caused network breaches. Eligibility for this liability 
protection, however, does not eliminate the basic tier requirement for the participants to 
hold a cyber attack insurance policy, but could prevent them from having to use it. As 
with the liability caps in the basic tier, this protection only applies to cyber attacks that 
are determined to be linked to the participants’ relationship with the DOD. In the face of 
growing cyber attack litigation costs, this type of liability protection will serve as a very 
powerful incentive for DIB companies to join the program at the advanced tier and adopt 
its network security practices. 
Figure 12 presents a visual depiction of the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program 
including its security requirements and incentive elements: 
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The width of each tier represents the relative number of expected participants at that tier. 
Figure 12.  The Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program Structure 
C. ENHANCED DOD CS/IA PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION 
The structure to effectively administer the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program 
already exists within the DOD. As previously discussed, the DC3, by hosting the DCISE, 
continues to operate the enhanced program’s real time information sharing and cyber 
threat tracking component. So this part of the enhanced program’s administrative 
structure requires little change. The current DOD DIB CS/IA Program Office also 
already exists. Since the program office is already in place, it is a reasonable initial 
location to handle all the remaining administration for the enhanced program. However, 
the program office must be structured and staffed to deal with all aspects program 
advocacy; application processing; providing technical assistance with network 
vulnerability self-assessments and network remediation; validation of network 
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vulnerability self-assessments; providing guidance and assistance for third-party 
conducted vulnerability assessments; coordinating with the DC3 to ensure active program 
participants have access to the DCISE; and coordination with the office of the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) for 
establishment and maintenance of APLs and ASLs. The program office must also 
maintain and provide program participants the documentation required to invoke liability 
protections during litigation proceedings and deal with the enhanced program’s cost 
sharing initiatives. The program office may require additional personnel structure and 
funding to effectively operate under the enhanced program’s increased scope and 
administrative requirements. Since the baseline organizational structure for the enhanced 
program already exists, this increase in administrative requirements is not an 
insurmountable problem. Additionally, the DOD could decide to contract some of these 
administrative requirements, thereby reducing the administrative burden on the program 
office. 
D. THE ENHANCED PROGRAM’S ASSOCIATED COSTS 
The DOD will be required to bear some financial burden in order to establish and 
operate the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program. At the basic tier, one program element is a 
cost driver: license costs for the vulnerability scanners that must be purchased. The DOD 
should work with the scanner providers to purchase the scanner licenses in bulk to reduce 
costs. The advanced tier has two program elements that are cost drivers: cost sharing for 
participants’ post-breach network remediation and cost sharing for third-party conducted 
network vulnerability assessments and penetration testing. Any additional personnel 
overhead within the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program Office is an additional cost driver 
for the program. To deal with the increased administrative burden of the enhanced 
program, at least some personnel structure may have to be added to the program office. 
The amount and type of personnel structure added is dependent on how the DOD 
implements the program and if the entire administrative burden described previously is 
placed directly under the program office, spread loaded among separate DOD offices, or 
potentially partially contracted out. In order to gauge the personnel costs, the author used 
the General Schedule (GS) pay scale. The GS grades listed in Table 7 were chosen as an 
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example set, as these grades are capable of handling the additional administrative tasks 
for the enhanced program. The companies listed under the scanner licensing and 
vulnerability assessment costs provided the cost information either through posted 
website information or through direct price quotes to the author.  
Table 7 represents a summary of the costs from the Enhanced DOD CS/IA 
Program the DOD can expect to bear. The cost amounts listed in Table 7 will be affected 
by how the DOD ultimately decides to implement the enhanced program. So capturing 
exact costs at this point in the program design process is not feasible. Thus, the costs 
listed in Table 7 are meant to represent a rough order of the magnitude the DOD can 
expect to see for the enhanced program. Table 7 indicates the enhanced program’s costs 
could be significant: 
Table 7.   Summary of Enhanced Program Costs to DOD 
Personnel Costs210 
GS-5 GS-6 GS-7 GS-8 GS-9 
$32,030 $35,704 $39,677 $43,939 $48,531 
 
Basic Tier Costs 
















Annual Retina License 
Through Beyond Trust214 
$2,920 $1,947 $1,578,890 $1,700 
 
Advanced Tier Costs 
                                                 
210 Office of Personnel Management, 2016 General Schedule (Base) Salary Table (Annual Rate), 
2016, https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/salaries-wages/2016/general-schedule/. 
211 “Tenable Store,” Tenable.com, accessed April 28, 2016, 
https://store.tenable.com/?main_page=index&cPath=23. 
212 Carly Evers (sales representative at Blue Tech Inc.), provided open market quote to the author, 
March 30, 2016. 
213 Darrell Boyd (sales representative at Convergence Technology), provided open market quote to the 
author, May 4, 2016. 
214 “BeyondTrust Store,” BeyondTrust.com, accessed March 30, 2016, http://shop.beyondtrust.com/
store?SiteID=eeyeinc&Action=DisplayProductDetailsPage&productID=285899100&pgm=94163000. 
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Network Vulnerability Assessments and Penetration Testing Costs 
Main Nerve Convergence 
Technology 
Core Security 
10 External & 30 
Internal IPs215 
For a Larger 
Number of IP 
Bundles216 
10 External & 
150 Internal 
IPs217 
Cost Per Week218 





Network Remediation Costs 
Ponemon Institute Kaspersky Labs219 




$591,780 $973,130 $551,000 $38,000 
 
The costs for the vulnerability scanner licenses, vulnerability assessments, 
penetration testing, and network remediation is likely to be on the upper end of the cost 
scale. Buying the scanner licenses in a block or in quantity may lower the cost per 
license. Also, DOD contracting agencies can likely achieve a lower price for all these 
cost items when negotiating with the individual service providers. Lastly, as discussed 
previously, these program elements are cost sharing measures. The DOD is not going to 
bear the full amount of these costs. 
                                                 
215 “MainNerve Penetration Testing,” MainNerve.com, accessed March 30, 2016, 
http://mainnerve.calls.net/pentest/?pmc=G-pentest&gclid=COOv77yz5MsCFUlufgodMWIJGw. 
216 Kim Christensen (V.P. Customer Development of Mainnerve.com), in phone call with author, 
April 5, 2016. 
217 Darrell Boyd (Sales Officer at Convergence Technology), “Re: Vulnerability Assessment/Pen 
Testing,” in email message to author, April 28, 2016. 
218 Gregory Boudah (Sales Officer at Core Security), “RE: Core Security More info Request,” In 
email message to author, March 28, 2016. 
219 Kaspersky Lab, “Damage Control: The Cost of Security Breaches,” 2 (2015). 
220 Ponemon Institute, sponsored by Hewlett Packard, “2012 Cost of Cyber Crime Study: United 
States,” 5 (2012). 




In this chapter, a significant restructuring and increase in scope for the current 
DOD DIB CS/IA Program is recommended. The successful implementation of these 
recommendations will require a significant investment in both emphasis and resources 
toward the enhanced program by both the DOD and DIB participants. The DOD must 
direct additional effort, manpower, and funding to the enhanced program to adequately 
incentivize it in order to influence DIB participants to achieve improved network 
security. The DIB participants must also invest additional resources in order to meet the 
enhanced program’s network security requirements. However, if both parties are willing 
to fully commit to the enhanced program and make the necessary investments, then both 
parties will have an opportunity to reap significant benefits from the enhanced program. 
The DIB participants stand to gain improved network security with assistance from the 
DOD, significant financial incentives reduced liability risk, and reduced financial risk. 
The DODIN’s security will improve because improved security of third-party networks 
that contact the DODIN will close off many potential attack vectors into the DODIN. So 
by assisting the DIB participants and providing stronger incentives to improve their 
network security, the DOD stands to gain improved security for the DODIN and, 
consequently, reduced operational risk.  
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Completely securing information networks and driving the risk of network 
breaches to zero are impossible tasks. Software programing and network architectures 
have become so dynamic and complex that it is effectively impossible to know every 
detail of the software and network systems an organization uses. Thus, attempting to 
completely secure networks becomes cost prohibitive and would require such restrictive 
security measures that networks would become nearly unusable. Conversely, poorly 
secured networks do not adequately mitigate risks of network breaches. So the task for 
network administrators is to appropriately manage the risk to their networks. The risk 
equation presented in Chapter II manages this problem by balancing acceptable risk 
levels with the controls required to achieve these levels.  
Unfortunately, there are several reasons why many organizations fail to properly 
assess and manage the risk to their information networks. First, companies do not 
understand the enormous scope and capability of the threats their networks face,222 and 
so they do not prioritize network security.223 Second, as discussed in Chapter II, the full 
scope of cyber attack costs are extremely difficult to assess accurately. Additionally, 
some of the direct costs incurred due to cyber attacks are often born by other parties than 
the actual attack victim.224 Consequently, companies fail to fully appreciate the financial 
risk they face from cyber attacks,225226 and thus make poor cost/benefit decisions for 
network security investments.227 Kaspersky Lab supports these contentions with data that 
indicates, even as recently as of 2015, that only approximately 50 percent of IT 
                                                 
222 McAfee Labs with Intel Security, McAfee Labs Threats Report, 9–10 (August 2015). 
223 Burns and Price, eds., Securing Cyberspace: A New Domain for National Security, 130. 
224 Benjamin Dean, “Sorry Consumers, Companies have little Incentive to Invest in Better 
Cybersecurity,” Quartz, March 05, 2015, http://qz.com/356274/cybersecurity-breaches-hurt-consumers-
companies-not-so-much/. 
225 Kaspersky Lab, “Damage Control: The Cost of Security Breaches,” 6 (2015). 
226 CSIS, “The Economic Impact of Cybercrime and Cyber Espionage,” 3 (2013). 
227 Burns and Price, eds., Securing Cyberspace: A New Domain for National Security, 132.  
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professionals list defending against network breaches as one of their top three 
concerns.228 So companies will prioritize other business related-functions ahead of 
network security.229 Thus, poor organizational cyber security is often the result of a lack 
of a security-based mindset, proper education in network security, and the will to enforce 
security.  
The DOD is knowledgeable and experienced in analyzing risk to and 
prioritization of network security for the DODIN. However, due to the DODIN’s size and 
scope, one of its significant security weaknesses is the number of third-party networks 
that routinely connect to it. The DOD itself has estimated that there are over 10,000 
networks for DOD contractors alone.230 Since the majority of these third-party networks 
do not belong to the federal government, the DOD cannot exercise authority over them. 
So the DOD finds it extremely difficult to influence these third-party networks’ security 
posture. The current DOD DIB CS/IA Program is DOD’s attempt to positively affect this 
lack of awareness and influence through information sharing and limited technical 
assistance to covered defense contractors. Unfortunately, the current program does not 
take bold enough steps to make a pronounced effect on the security posture of the third-
party networks that contact the DODIN. As discussed in Chapter III, the current program 
limits participants to only covered defense contractors; consequently, it does not even 
address a large number of other third-party networks that may contact the DODIN. The 
current program also offers no real incentive for participating companies to take any 
significant action to improve their network security. Security professionals have 
recognized and stressed the need for governments to provide incentives for the private 
sector to more fully invest in network security.231 So incentives are where the DOD must 
take a bolder approach with regards to influencing third-party network security. To 
achieve the largest impact, the incentives should be primarily financial risk and 
                                                 
228 Kaspersky Lab, “Damage Control: The Cost of Security Breaches,” 6 (2015). 
229 Burns and Price, eds., Securing Cyberspace: A New Domain for National Security, 133. 
230 Department of Defense (DOD)-Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity (CS) Activities, 
Federal Register 80, no 191, 59583 (October 2, 2015). 
231 Burns and Price, eds., Securing Cyberspace: A New Domain for National Security, 130. 
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assistance-based. The answer to the lack of incentive in the current DOD DIB CS/IA 
Program is the proposed Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program.  
The Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program, through its tiered structure of network 
security requirements and incentives, will engage a broader scope of third-party networks 
that contact the DODIN. As explained in Chapter IV, the program’s network security 
requirements will be based on NIST recommended security best practices. These security 
requirements will give the DOD a method to influence and assess the risk these third-
party networks present to the DODIN. The program’s incentive elements will provide the 
DOD mechanisms to attract organizations to the program and influence over their 
network security posture. On a more strategic level, the enhanced program will also allow 
the DOD to assume a greater role in protecting the private sector’s information networks. 
Some security professionals have made the argument that the government must 
take greater responsibility to protect and secure private information networks.232 Should 
the federal government decide to seriously consider this argument, then another course of 
action for the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program potentially exists. In this course of action, 
the federal government would give control of the enhanced program to DHS. Several 
reasons exist for why this course of action makes sense and should be considered. First, 
one of DHS’s core missions is to work with the private sector to secure information 
networks.233 So this program would fit clearly inside DHS’s mission set. Second, due to 
its mission set, DHS has the ability to expand the program’s effects further because DHS 
can apply it to the whole of government, meaning any organization that interacts with any 
part of the federal government and not just the DOD. Lastly, since the enhanced program 
is modeled on the Safety Act Program, DHS already has resident knowledge and 
experience operating a program with similar structure and function. 
Political, military, and private sector leaders must understand that private sector 
information network security is directly linked to national security.234 Consequently, in 
                                                 
232 Ibid., 130–131. 
233 “Our Mission,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed April 8, 2016, https://www.dhs.gov/
our-mission. 
234 Burns and Price, eds., Securing Cyberspace: A New Domain for National Security, 129. 
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order to protect national security, a shift in mindset on network security must occur. The 
mindset must be that security, as well as risk assessment and mitigation are integral to all 
networks that support operations. The government must take the lead in order to ensure 
this mindset shift occurs.235236 The Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program, whether it remains a 
DOD program or potentially shifts to DHS, is a step forward in the government’s 
leadership role in network security. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program 
The author recommends the DOD implement the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program 
as it is presented in this thesis. In order to fully implement the enhanced program, the 
author recommends the DOD take the following actions: 
 Work with Congress to create and pass legislation that would legally 
create the program’s liability protections for participants 
 Modify the DFARS to create the APLs, ASLs, and new contract bid 
evaluation criteria to support the program 
 Further explore pricing and appropriate fiscal methods to support cost 
sharing for network remediation, vulnerability assessments, penetration 
testing, and vulnerability scanner licenses 
 Develop the enhanced program’s self-assessment checklist or form using 
the NIST Special Publications listed in this thesis 
 Conduct troop-to-task and budgetary analyses on the DOD DIB CS/IA 
Program Office based on the enhanced program’s requirements to 
determine appropriate program office staffing and funding requirements 
To aid the first action, the original language used for the Safety Act legislation 
has been included in Appendix C. 
2. Program Control 
                                                 
235 Ibid., 135. 
236 Henry Kenyon, “U.S. Still Lacks Some Basic Essentials for Cyber Defense,” Defense Systems, 
January 28, 2011, https://defensesystems.com/articles/2011/01/28/cyber-defense-remains-
incomplete.aspx?admgarea=DS. 
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The author recommends that the DOD and DHS begin discussions to determine 
which department should operate and control the enhanced program. Both the DOD and 
DHS have specific interests and missions, but the two departments must evaluate this 
question from a perspective of how the enhanced program can serve these specific 
interests while also better serving the greater national interest. Consequently, the author 
recommends placing program control under DHS because dealing with the security of 
private sector information networks is already a DHS core mission and the program will 
have greater ability to reduce risk to whole of government and private sector under DHS. 
Ultimately, the decision must be made by where DOD and DHS assess the enhanced 
program can best reduce risk to government networks and improve private sector network 
security.  
C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
While this thesis provides an example self-assessment form, additional work 
should be done to further refine this form. Additionally, work should be done to develop 
separate forms for companies that may have differing security categories based on their 
size and business type. The author recommends this be done as soon as possible. The 
finalization of the self-assessment form will be critical to how well the enhanced program 
is able to improve and maintain the participants’ network security posture. This future 
work should ensure the previously discussed critical best practices from the NIST Special 
Publications are included into the checklist, while not making it too complicated or 
onerous for participants to use. This checklist could also prove beneficial to other 
governmental or private sector organizations looking for a structured, yet relatively 
simple way to assess their networks. 
This thesis investigated the enhanced program’s costs, but only for a rough order 
of magnitude. However, before the enhanced program is implemented, a full cost benefit 
analysis must be completed for the program. This cost benefit analysis will allow the 
DOD or DHS to better plan for program costs, as well as justify these costs to senior 
leadership and Congress. The cost benefit analysis information will also support a more 
thorough risk analyses for the DODIN. 
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Program metrics are an important aspect of the enhanced program, and they were 
not developed in this thesis. Therefore, before the program is implemented, the author 
recommends that well defined metrics be developed to allow program managers to 
determine if the enhanced program is meeting its security objectives. Metrics may also 
tell program managers where the enhanced program should be modified or adjusted to 
better achieve its security objectives. Lastly, good metrics will aid program managers in 
defending the program and its budgetary requirements to their superiors and to political 
leadership. Examples of metrics that should be considered are number of program 
participants, rate of new program applicants, the number/rate of attacks conducted against 
the DODIN through third-party networks, and the number/rate of companies that 
compromise DOD information due to network breaches. Though, many other metrics 
could be created as well. 
Lastly, personnel and budgetary requirements for the program office were 
discussed in this thesis but not in great detail. The author recommends that a detailed 
troop-to-task and budget analysis be conducted for the program office based on the 
enhanced program’s requirements. These analyses will be critical in determining the 
personnel staffing and funding levels necessary for the program office to effectively 
operate the enhanced program. 
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APPENDIX A. CURRENT U.S. TRANSCOM CONTRACTOR DATA 
Table 8.   U.S. TRANSCOM Contract Data237 
Company Date Awarded Contract Number Amount ($) 
American President 
Lines Ltd. Inc. 
February 25, 2016 HTC711-12-D-
W003 
128,565,957 
















February 25, 2016 HTC711-12-D-
W004 
33,470,691 





February 25, 2016 HTC711-12-D-
W012 
27,894,240 
Central Gulf Lines 
Inc. 
February 25, 2016 HTC711-12-D-
W005 
12,247,421 




Puerto Rico LLC 





February 24, 2016 HTC711-13-D-
C010 
125,922,873 






























                                                 
237 “United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) Defense Contracts Listing,” Military 
Industrial Complex, accessed April 26, 2016, http://www.militaryindustrialcomplex.com/us-transportation-
command-defense-contracts-listing.asp. 
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Company Date Awarded Contract Number Amount ($) 


















Totem Ocean Trailer 
Express Inc. 
January 6, 2016 HTC711-16-D-
W003 
30,438795 









This data represents only a partial set of current U.S. TRANSCOM contracts. This set contains 
only those contracts awarded since January 1, 2016.  
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APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE ENHANCED DOD CS/IA PROGRAM 
SELF-ASSESSMENT FORM 
The security control items in this example form are adapted from NIST SP 800–
53238 and NIST SP 800–171.239 The items taken from NIST SP 800–53 are to secure 
information networks judged to have a low impact Security Category (SC). SC’s are 
judged by how the three security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
impact a network.240 The definition of a low impact system is “an information system in 
which all three of the security objectives are low.”241 The DOD may decide that the 
private sector third-party networks it wants to influence are either moderate or high 
impact networks. This decision would affect the security control items from NIST SP 
800–53 that are included on the self-assessment form. 
The security controls items included in this example form are broken down into 
the 17 security control families for low impact networks listed in the NIST SP 800–53.242 
Supplemental guidance on these security control items can also be found in the NIST SP 
800–53. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: ACCESS CONTROL (AC) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to: to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. An access control policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 
 management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 
 compliance. 
 
                                                 
238 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 800–53 revision 4: Security 
and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, F-1 – F-233. 
239 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 800–171: Protecting 
Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Information Systems and Organizations, 9–14 (June 
2015), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-171.pdf. 
240 National Institute of Standards and Technology, Special Publication 800–53 revision 4: Security 
and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, 28. 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid., 9 and E-3. 
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 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the access control policy and 
 associated access controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current access control policy and procedures. [Assignment: 
organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Limits information system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of 
authorized users, or devices (including other information systems). 
 
4. Limits information system access to the types of transactions and functions that 
authorized users are permitted to execute. 
 
5. Separates the duties of individuals to reduce the risk of malevolent activity without 
collusion. 
 
6 Employs the principle of least privilege, including for specific security functions and 
privileged accounts. 
 
7. Uses non-privileged accounts or roles when accessing non-security functions. 
 
8. Prevents non-privileged users from executing privileged functions and audit the 
execution of such functions. 
 
9. Limits unsuccessful logon attempts. 
 
10. Uses session lock with pattern-hiding displays to prevent access/viewing of data after 
a period of inactivity. 
 
11. Terminates (automatically) a user session after a defined condition. 
 
12. Monitors and controls remote access sessions. 
 
13. Employs cryptographic mechanisms to protect the confidentiality of remote access 
sessions. 
 
14. Routes remote access via managed access control points. 
 
15. Authorizes remote execution of privileged commands and remote access to security-
relevant information. 
 
16. Authorize wireless access prior to allowing such connections. 
 
17. Protects wireless access using authentication and encryption. 
 
18. Controls connection of mobile devices. 
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19. Verifies and controls/limits connections to and use of external information systems. 
 
20. Limits use of organizational portable storage devices on external information 
systems. 
 
21. Controls information posted or processed on publicly accessible information systems. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: AWARENESS AND TRAINING (AT) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to: to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
  
 a. A security awareness and training policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
  
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security awareness and 
 training policy and associated security awareness and training controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current security awareness and training policy and 
procedures. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. The organization provides basic security awareness training to information system 
users (including managers, senior executives, and contractors): 
  
 a. As part of initial training for new users. 
  
 b. When required by information system changes. 
  
 c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 
 
4. The organization provides role-based security training to personnel with assigned 
security roles and responsibilities: 
  
 a. Before authorizing access to the information system or performing assigned 
 duties. 
  
 b. When required by information system changes. 
  
 c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 
 
5. Documents and monitors individual information system security training activities 




6. Retains individual training records for [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 
 
7. Ensures that managers, systems administrators, and users of organizational information 
systems are made aware of the security risks associated with their activities and of the 
applicable policies, standards, and procedures related to the security of organizational 
information systems. 
 
8. Provide security awareness training on recognizing and reporting potential indicators 
of insider threat. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (AU) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
  
 a. An audit and accountability policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
  
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the audit and accountability 
 policy and associated audit and accountability controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current audit and accountability policy and procedures. 
[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Reviews and analyzes information system audit records [Assignment: organization-
defined frequency] for indications of [Assignment: organization-defined inappropriate or 
unusual activity]. 
 
4. Reports findings to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]. 
 
5. Ensure that the actions of individual information system users can be uniquely traced 
to those users so they can be held accountable for their actions. 
 
6. Alert in the event of an audit process failure. 
 
7. Use automated mechanisms to integrate and correlate audit review, analysis, and 
reporting processes for investigation and response to indications of inappropriate, 
suspicious, or unusual activity. 
 




9. Provide an information system capability that compares and synchronizes internal 
system clocks with an authoritative source to generate time stamps for audit records. 
 
10. Protect audit information and audit tools from unauthorized access, modification, and 
deletion. 
 
11. Limit management of audit functionality to a subset of privileged users. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND 
AUTHORIZATION (CA) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. A security assessment and authorization policy that addresses purpose, scope, 
 roles,  responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among 
 organizational entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security assessment and 
 authorization policy and associated security assessment and authorization 
 controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current security assessment and authorization policy and 
procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Develops a security assessment plan that describes the scope of the assessment 
including: 
 
 a. Security controls and control enhancements under assessment. 
 
 b. Assessment procedures to be used to determine security control effectiveness. 
 
 c. Assessment environment, assessment team, and assessment roles and 
 responsibilities. 
 
4. Assesses the security controls in the information system and its environment of 
operation [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] to determine the extent to which 
the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired 
outcome with respect to meeting established security requirements. 
 
5. Produces a security assessment report that documents the results of the assessment. 
 
6. Provides the results of the security control assessment to [Assignment: organization-
defined individuals or roles]. 
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7. Authorizes connections from the information system to other information systems 
through the use of Interconnection Security Agreements. 
 
8. Documents, for each interconnection, the interface characteristics, security 
requirements, and the nature of the information communicated. 
 
9. Reviews and updates Interconnection Security Agreements [Assignment: organization-
defined frequency]. 
 
10. Develops a plan of action and milestones for the information system to document the 
organization’s planned remedial actions to correct weaknesses or deficiencies noted 
during the assessment of the security controls and to reduce or eliminate known 
vulnerabilities in the system. 
 
11. Updates existing plan of action and milestones [Assignment: organization-defined 
frequency] based on the findings from security controls assessments, security impact 
analyses, and continuous monitoring activities. 
 
12. Assigns a senior-level executive or manager as the authorizing official for the 
information system. 
 
13. Ensures that the authorizing official authorizes the information system for processing 
before commencing operations. 
 
14. Updates the security authorization [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
15. The organization develops a continuous monitoring strategy and implements a 
continuous monitoring program that includes: 
 
 a. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined metrics] to be monitored. 
 
 b. Establishment of [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for 
 monitoring and [Assignment: organization-defined frequencies] for 
 assessments supporting such  monitoring. 
 
 c. Ongoing security control assessments in accordance with the organizational 
 continuous monitoring strategy. 
 
 d. Ongoing security status monitoring of organization-defined metrics in 
 accordance with the organizational continuous monitoring strategy. 
 
 e. Correlation and analysis of security-related information generated by 
 assessments and monitoring. 
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 f. Response actions to address results of the analysis of security-related 
 information. 
 
 g. Reporting the security status of organization and the information system to 
 [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Assignment: 
 organization-defined frequency]. 
 
16. Authorizes internal connections of [Assignment: organization-defined information 
system components or classes of components] to the information system. 
 
17. Documents, for each internal connection, the interface characteristics, security 
requirements, and the nature of the information communicated. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT (CM) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. A configuration management policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the configuration management 
 policy  and associated configuration management controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current configuration management policy and procedures 
[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. The organization develops, documents, and maintains under configuration control, a 
current baseline configuration of the information system. 
 
4. The organization analyzes changes to the information system to determine potential 
security impacts prior to change implementation. 
 
5. Develops and documents an inventory of information system components that: 
 
 a. Accurately reflects the current information system. 
 
 b. Includes all components within the authorization boundary of the information 
 system. 
 
 c. Is at the level of granularity deemed necessary for tracking and reporting. 
 




7. Establishes and enforces security configuration settings for information technology 
products employed in organizational information systems. 
 
8. Defines, documents, approves, and enforce physical and logical access restrictions 
associated with changes to the information system. 
 
9. Employs the principle of least functionality by configuring the information system to 
provide only essential capabilities. 
 
10. Restricts, disables, and prevents the use of nonessential programs, functions, ports, 
protocols, and services. 
 
11. Applies deny-by-exception (blacklist) policy to prevent the use of unauthorized 
software or deny-all, permit-by-exception (whitelisting) policy to allow the execution of 
authorized software. 
 
12. Controls and monitors user-installed software. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: CONTINGENCY PLANNING (CP) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
  
 a. A contingency planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
  
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the contingency planning policy 
 and associated contingency planning controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current contingency planning policy and procedures 
[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. The organization provides contingency training to information system users consistent 
with assigned roles and responsibilities: 
 
 a. Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming a 
 contingency role or responsibility. 
 
 b. When required by information system changes. 
 
 c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 
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4. Tests the contingency plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-
defined frequency] using [Assignment: organization-defined tests] to determine the 
effectiveness of the plan and the organizational readiness to execute the plan. 
 
5. Reviews the contingency plan test results. 
 
6. Initiates corrective actions, if needed. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (IA) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. An identification and authentication policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the identification and 
 authentication  policy and associated identification and authentication controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current identification and authentication policy and 
procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Identifies information system users and processes acting on behalf of users or devices. 
 
4. Authenticates (or verify) the identities of users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite 
to allowing access to organizational information systems. 
 
5. Uses multifactor authentication for local and network access to privileged accounts and 
for network access to non-privileged accounts. 
 
6. Employs replay-resistant authentication mechanisms for network access to privileged 
and non-privileged accounts. 
 
7. Prevents reuse of identifiers for a defined period. 
 
8. Disables identifiers after a defined period of inactivity. 
 
9. Enforces a minimum password complexity and change of characters when new 
passwords are created. 
 
10. Prohibits password reuse for a specified number of generations. 
 




12. Stores and transmits only encrypted representation of passwords. 
 
13. Obscures feedback of authentication information. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: INCIDENT RESPONSE (IR) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. An incident response policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the incident response policy and 
 associated incident response controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current incident response policy and procedures [Assignment: 
organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. The organization provides incident response training to information system users 
consistent with assigned roles and responsibilities: 
 
 a. Within [Assignment: organization-defined time period] of assuming an incident 
 response role or responsibility. 
 
 b. When required by information system changes. 
 
 c. [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] thereafter. 
 
4. Tracks, documents, and reports incidents to appropriate officials and/or authorities 
both internal and external to the organization. 
 
5. Establishes an operational incident-handling capability for organizational information 
systems that includes adequate preparation, detection, analysis, containment, recovery, 
and user response activities. 
 
6. Tests the organizational incident response capability. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: MAINTENANCE (MA) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 91 
 a. A system maintenance policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system maintenance policy 
 and associated system maintenance controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current system maintenance policy and procedures 
[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Performs maintenance on organizational information systems. 
 
4. Provides effective controls on the tools, techniques, mechanisms, and personnel used 
to conduct information system maintenance. 
 
5. Ensures equipment removed for off-site maintenance is sanitized. 
 
6. Checks media containing diagnostic and test programs for malicious code before the 
media are used in the information system. 
 
7. Requires multifactor authentication to establish nonlocal maintenance sessions via 
external network connections and terminate such connections when nonlocal 
maintenance is complete. 
 
8. Supervises the maintenance activities of maintenance personnel without required 
access authorization. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: MEDIA PROTECTION (MP) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. A media protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 
 management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 
 compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the media protection policy and 
 associated media protection controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current media protection policy and procedures [Assignment: 
organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Sanitize or destroy information system media before disposal or release for reuse. 
 
4. Control the use of removable media on information system components. 
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5. Prohibit the use of portable storage devices when such devices have no identifiable 
owner. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL (PE) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. A physical and environmental protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, 
 roles,  responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among 
 organizational entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the physical and environmental 
 protection policy and associated physical and environmental protection controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current physical and environmental protection policy and 
procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Monitors physical access to the facility where the information system resides to detect 
and respond to physical security incidents. 
 
4. Limits physical access to organizational information systems, equipment, and the 
respective operating environments to authorized individuals. 
 
5. Reviews physical access logs [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] and upon 
occurrence of [Assignment: organization-defined events or potential indications of 
events]. 
 
6. Coordinates results of reviews and investigations with the organizational incident 
response capability. 
 
7. Maintains visitor access records to the facility where the information system resides for 
[Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 
 
8. Escorts visitors and monitor visitor activity. 
 
9. Reviews visitor access records [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: PLANNING (PL) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
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 a. A security planning policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 
 management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 
 compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the security planning policy and 
 associated security planning controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current security planning policy and procedures [Assignment: 
organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Develops a security plan for the information system that: 
 
 a. Is consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture. 
 
 b. Explicitly defines the authorization boundary for the system. 
 
 c. Describes the operational context of the information system in terms of 
 missions and business processes. 
 
 d. Provides the security categorization of the information system including 
 supporting rationale. 
 
 e. Describes the operational environment for the information system and 
 relationships  with or connections to other information systems. 
 
 f. Provides an overview of the security requirements for the system. 
 
 g. Identifies any relevant overlays, if applicable. 
 
 h. Describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those 
 requirements  including a rationale for the tailoring decisions. 
 
 i. Is reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or designated 
 representative prior to plan implementation. 
 
4. Distributes copies of the security plan and communicates subsequent changes to the 
plan to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]. 
 
5. Reviews the security plan for the information system [Assignment: organization-
defined frequency]. 
 
6. Updates the plan to address changes to the information system/environment of 




7. Protects the security plan from unauthorized disclosure and modification. 
 
8. Establishes and makes readily available to individuals requiring access to the 
information system, the rules that describe their responsibilities and expected behavior 
with regard to information and information system usage. 
 
9. Receives a signed acknowledgment from such individuals, indicating that they have 
read, understand, and agree to abide by the rules of behavior, before authorizing access to 
information and the information system. 
 
10. Reviews and updates the rules of behavior [Assignment: organization-defined 
frequency]. 
 
11. Requires individuals who have signed a previous version of the rules of behavior to 
read and re-sign when the rules of behavior are revised/updated. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: PERSONNEL SECURITY (PS) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. A personnel security policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among  organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the personnel security policy and 
 associated personnel security controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current personnel security policy and procedures 
[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Develops and documents access agreements for organizational information systems. 
 
4. Reviews and updates the access agreements [Assignment: organization-defined 
frequency]. 
 
5. Ensures that individuals requiring access to organizational information and information 
systems: 
 
 a. Sign appropriate access agreements prior to being granted access. 
 
 b. Re-sign access agreements to maintain access to organizational information 
 systems when access agreements have been updated or [Assignment: 
 organization-defined  frequency]. 
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6. Establishes personnel security requirements including security roles and 
responsibilities for third-party providers. 
 
7. Requires third-party providers to comply with personnel security policies and 
procedures established by the organization. 
 
8. Documents personnel security requirements. 
 
9. Requires third-party providers to notify [Assignment: organization-defined personnel 
or roles] of any personnel transfers or terminations of third-party personnel who possess 
organizational credentials and/or badges, or who have information system privileges 
within [Assignment: organization-defined time period]. 
 
10. Monitors provider compliance. 
 
11. Screens individuals prior to authorizing access to information systems containing 
CUI. 
 
12. Ensures information systems are protected during and after personnel actions such as 
terminations and transfers. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: RISK ASSESSMENT (RA) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. A risk assessment policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, 
 management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and 
 compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the risk assessment policy and 
 associated risk assessment controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current risk assessment policy and procedures [Assignment: 
organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Conducts an assessment of risk, including the likelihood and magnitude of harm, from 
the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of the 
information system and the information it processes, stores, or transmits. 
 
4. Documents risk assessment results in [Selection: security plan; risk assessment report; 
[Assignment: organization-defined document]]. 
 
5. Reviews risk assessment results [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
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6. Disseminates risk assessment results to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel 
or roles]. 
 
7. Updates the risk assessment [Assignment: organization-defined frequency] or 
whenever there are significant changes to the information system or environment of 
operation (including the identification of new threats and vulnerabilities), or other 
conditions that may impact the security state of the system. 
 
8. Scans for vulnerabilities in the information system and hosted applications 
[Assignment: organization-defined frequency and/or randomly in accordance with 
organization-defined process] and when new vulnerabilities potentially affecting the 
system/applications are identified and reported. 
 
9. Employs vulnerability scanning tools and techniques that facilitate interoperability 
among tools and automate parts of the vulnerability management process by using 
standards for. 
 
 a. Enumerating platforms, software flaws, and improper configurations. 
 
 b. Formatting checklists and test procedures. 
 
 c. Measuring vulnerability impact. 
 
10. Analyzes vulnerability scan reports and results from security control assessments. 
 
11. Remediates legitimate vulnerabilities [Assignment: organization-defined response 
times] in accordance with an organizational assessment of risk. 
 
12. Shares information obtained from the vulnerability scanning process and security 
control assessments with [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] to help 
eliminate similar vulnerabilities in other information systems (i.e., systemic weaknesses 
or deficiencies). 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION (SA) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. A system and services acquisition policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and services 
 acquisition policy and associated system and services acquisition controls. 
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2. Reviews and updates the current system and services acquisition policy and procedures 
[Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Determines information security requirements for the information system or 
information system service in mission/business process planning. 
 
4. Determines, documents, and allocates the resources required to protect the information 
system or information system service as part of its capital planning and investment 
control process. 
 
5. Establishes a discrete line item for information security in organizational programming 
and budgeting documentation. 
 
6. Manages the information system using [Assignment: organization-defined system 
development life cycle] that incorporates information security considerations. 
 
7. Defines and documents information security roles and responsibilities throughout the 
system development life cycle. 
 
8. Identifies individuals having information security roles and responsibilities. 
 
9. Integrates the organizational information security risk management process into system 
development life cycle activities. 
 
10. The organization includes the following requirements, descriptions, and criteria, 
explicitly or by reference, in the acquisition contract for the information system, system 
component, or information system service in accordance with applicable federal laws, 
Executive Orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, guidelines, and 
organizational mission/business needs: 
 
 a. Security functional requirements. 
 
 b. Security strength requirements. 
 
 c. Security assurance requirements. 
 
 d. Security-related documentation requirements. 
 
 e. Requirements for protecting security-related documentation. 
 
 f. Description of the information system development environment and 
 environment in which the system is intended to operate. 
 
 g. Acceptance criteria. 
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11. The organization employs only information technology products on the FIPS 201-
approved products list for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) capability implemented 
within organizational information systems. 
 
12. Obtains administrator documentation for the information system, system component, 
or information system service that describes: 
 
 a. Secure configuration, installation, and operation of the system, component, or 
 service. 
 
 b. Effective use and maintenance of security functions/mechanisms. 
 
 c. Known vulnerabilities regarding configuration and use of administrative (i.e., 
 privileged) functions. 
 
13. Obtains user documentation for the information system, system component, or 
information system service that describes: 
 
 a. User-accessible security functions/mechanisms and how to effectively use those 
 security functions/mechanisms. 
 
 b. Methods for user interaction, which enables individuals to use the system, 
 component, or service in a more secure manner. 
 
 c. User responsibilities in maintaining the security of the system, component, or 
 service. 
 
14. Documents attempts to obtain information system, system component, or information 
system service documentation when such documentation is either unavailable or 
nonexistent and takes [Assignment: organization-defined actions] in response. 
 
15. Protects documentation as required, in accordance with the risk management strategy. 
 
16. Distributes documentation to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]. 
 
17. Requires that providers of external information system services comply with 
organizational information security requirements and employ [Assignment: organization-
defined security controls] in accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, 
directives, policies, regulations, standards, and guidance. 
 
18. Defines and documents government oversight and user roles and responsibilities with 
regard to external information system services. 
 
19. Employs [Assignment: organization-defined processes, methods, and techniques] to 
monitor security control compliance by external service providers on an ongoing basis. 
 99 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATION 
PROTECTION (SC) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. A system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, 
 roles,  responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among 
 organizational entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and communications 
 protection policy and associated system and communications protection controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current system and communications protection policy and 
procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. The information system maintains a separate execution domain for each executing 
process. 
 
4. Monitors, control, and protect organizational communications (i.e., information 
transmitted or received by organizational information systems) at the external boundaries 
and key internal boundaries of the information systems. 
 
5. Employs architectural designs, software development techniques, and systems 
engineering principles that promote effective information security within organizational 
information systems. 
 
6. Separates user functionality from information system management functionality. 
 
7. Prevents unauthorized and unintended information transfer via shared system 
resources. 
 
8. Implements subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are physically 
or logically separated from internal networks. 
 
9. Denys network communications traffic by default and allow network communications 
traffic by exception (i.e., deny all, permit by exception). 
 
10. Prevents remote devices from simultaneously establishing non-remote connections 
with the information system and communicating via some other connection to resources 
in external networks. 
 
11. Terminates network connections associated with communications sessions at the end 
of the sessions or after a defined period of inactivity. 
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12. Establishes and manage cryptographic keys for cryptography employed in the 
information system. 
 
13. Prohibits remote activation of collaborative computing devices and provide indication 
of devices in use to users present at the device. 
 
14. Controls and monitor the use of mobile code. 
 
15. Controls and monitor the use of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) technologies. 
 
16. Protects the authenticity of communications sessions. 
 
SECURITY CONTROL FAMILY: SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY (SI) 
 
1. Develops, documents, and disseminates to [Assignment: organization-defined 
personnel or roles]: 
 
 a. A system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, 
 responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational 
 entities, and compliance. 
 
 b. Procedures to facilitate the implementation of the system and information 
 integrity policy and associated system and information integrity controls. 
 
2. Reviews and updates the current system and information integrity policy and 
procedures [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]. 
 
3. Monitors the information system to detect: 
 
 a. Attacks and indicators of potential attacks in accordance with [Assignment: 
 organization-defined monitoring objectives]. 
 
 b. Unauthorized local, network, and remote connections. 
 
 c. Identifies unauthorized use of the information system through [Assignment: 
 organization-defined techniques and methods]. 
 
4. Deploys monitoring devices: 
 
 a. Strategically within the information system to collect organization-determined 
 essential information. 
 
 b. At ad hoc locations within the system to track specific types of transactions of 
 interest to the organization. 
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5. Protects information obtained from intrusion-monitoring tools from unauthorized 
access, modification, and deletion. 
 
6. Heightens the level of information system monitoring activity whenever there is an 
indication of increased risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other 
organizations, or the Nation based on law enforcement information, intelligence 
information, or other credible sources of information. 
 
7. Obtains legal opinion with regard to information system monitoring activities in 
accordance with applicable federal laws, Executive Orders, directives, policies, or 
regulations. 
 
8. Provides [Assignment: organization-defined information system monitoring 
information] to [Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles] [Selection (one or 
more): as needed; [Assignment: organization-defined frequency]]. 
 
9. Receives information system security alerts, advisories, and directives from 
[Assignment: organization-defined external organizations] on an ongoing basis. 
 
10. Generates internal security alerts, advisories, and directives as deemed necessary. 
 
11. Disseminates security alerts, advisories, and directives to: [Selection (one or more): 
[Assignment: organization-defined personnel or roles]; [Assignment: organization-
defined elements within the organization]; [Assignment: organization-defined external 
organizations]]. 
 
12. Provides protection from malicious code at appropriate locations within 
organizational information systems. 
 
13. Updates malicious code protection mechanisms when new releases are available. 
 
14. Performs periodic scans of the information system and real-time scans of files from 
external sources as files are downloaded, opened, or executed. 
 
15. Monitors the information system including inbound and outbound communications 
traffic, to detect attacks and indicators of potential attacks. 
 
16. Identifies unauthorized use of the information system. 
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APPENDIX C. SAFETY ACT LEGISLATION TEXT 
The following text is Subtitle G—Support Anti-terrorism by Fostering Effective 
Technologies Act of 2002, of Title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.243 The 
text was copied directly from the Homeland Security Act of 2002. It is meant to provide 
example language for legislation that would support the liability protections contained in 
the Enhanced DOD CS/IA Program. The legislation’s text can also be found on DHS 
Safety Act website at: https://www.safetyact.gov/jsp/refdoc/samsRefDocSearch.do.244 
                                                 
243 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135 (November 25, 2002). 
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